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Target Marketing in a Distribution Channel: Implications for a Manufacturer's Returns Policy

非整合通路下製造商目標行銷之研究-製造商退貨保證的影響

摘要


由於顧客在購買前經常不能確認産品功能是否良好,實務上廠商對顧客提供退貨保證十分常見。在非整合通路下,製造商必須透過獨立的零售商銷售産品與回收退貨。然而零售商有其自利的考量,未必會配合製造商原先産品線的設計販售産品給目標顧客,因此造成製造商目標行銷的困難。本研究以賽局分析的方式,探討非整合通路下,獨占製造商透過獨占的零售商,銷售不同品質的産品給不同品質的偏好的市場區隔顧客時,製造商的退貨策略對其目標行銷及零售商動機問題的影響。研究結果發現,若高品質偏好的市場區隔較低品質偏好的市場區隔顧客有較高的退貨成本時,製造商透過零售商對低端産品提供退貨保證有以下的效果:第一,提供退貨保證有區隔顧客的效果,第二,提供零售商配合目標行銷的誘因。因此在非整合通路下製造商提供退價保證,能使自利的製造商與零售商雙方的目標更趨一致,對通路關係與目標行銷的達成有正面的影響。

並列摘要


A returns policy, which allows customers to return products for a refund, is commonly offered by manufacturers and retailers. In the markets of frequently purchased products, consumers who are dissatisfied with the products purchased from retailers usually return the products to the retailers rather than manufacturers. The end-user returns at the retail level, in turn, may create a pressure for returns from the retailer to the manufacturer. This paper considers a monopolistic manufacturer who designs a product line which has different functioning probability for each product (i.e. different quality). Each product may or may not be targeted at a different market segment. The manufacturer decides as well its returns policy (for retailers) and wholesale price for each type of product. Given the product line and returns policy offered by the manufacturer, the retailer decides which products to carry, which product to target to each segment, the returns policy (for consumers) and retail price for each product. Then given the retail price and retailer's returns policy, consumers decide whether and which product to buy. The results show that providing returns policy on the low-end product at the retail level can be used to screen consumers if consumers' valuations for product quality are positively correlated with their costs of returns. The screening effect, in turn, can alleviate the retailer's incentive problems in a distribution channel. Under some circumstances, the benefits of screening effects and less retailer's incentive problem are so high that it is worth for the manufacturer taking returns from the retailer even the returned merchandise is worthless. When it happens, the manufacturer optimally reduces the quality for the low-end product to best take advantage of the screening function of the returns policies. The intuition behind the result is, first, by using the returns policy as a screening tool, the retailer is able to extract extra consumer surplus from the high segment. That is, the cannibalization problem of the product line is alleviated as the retailer allows returns on the low-end product. Second, if the retailer accepts returns on the low-end product, this returns policy in turn reduces the difference in willingness-to-pay between the two segments, and as a result the retailer faces two more similar consumer segments. The retailer therefore has more incentives to target different products to consumers rather than sell the high-end product to the high segment only. Thus the lack of channel coordination in targeting is mitigated.

參考文獻


Shan-Yu Chou,Shih-Ping Jeng(2002).The manufacturer`s returns policy and product line design.NTU management review.13(1),31-65.
Braverman, A.,J.L. Guasch,S. Salop(1983).Defects in Disneyland: Quality Control as a Two-Part Tariff.Review of Economics Studies.50,121-132.
Davis, S.,E. Gerstner,M. Hagerty(1995).Money Back Guarantees in Retailing: Matching Products to Consumer Tastes.71(1),7-22.
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被引用紀錄


紀舒哲(2012)。治理機制、權力關係、激勵策略與通路績效之研究〔博士論文,國立臺北科技大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6841%2fNTUT.2012.00607

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