從人「性」論到共「同」體：孟子與荀子的方案

孟、荀之間「性善」與「性惡」的傳統對立模式，早已受到了近世學界的重新檢視，然而本文認為若以這兩種旗幟鮮明的人性論主張作為一個討論的引子，同時避開本質主義式的解讀模式，進而透顯出「性」所指向的具體生存性，則可以還原其背後蘊含的對於人與人「之間」生存現象的兩種觀察：孟子聚焦於人面對苦難中之他人時所逼顯出的「不忍」，荀子則聚焦於人與人之欲望衝突所召喚出的「有分」。「不忍」與「有分」的架構一方面澄清了孟子與荀子倫理學思考的起點，避免了某種在現實政治需求下被過度強化的政治話語型態，另一方面則為共同體提供了同時容納了同一與差異、分隔與共通的雙重原則，並拒絕了固化的共同性基礎。通過切近孟子與荀子所觀察到的這兩個原初現象起點，本文希望反省「性」與「同」這兩個語詞間的傳統連結，重新鬆動從倫理思考到政治理念的儒家圖式，以便看清他們如何在動盪不安的戰國亂世提出各自的濟世方案。

關鍵字

孟子；荀子；之間；人性論；共同體

並列摘要

This article starts from the famous argument between Mencius and Xunzi, ＂human nature is good＂ (xing shan) and ＂human nature is evil＂ (xing e). To avoid the essentialist interpretation of ＂xing,＂ the article tries to reveal two kinds of observations about the existential phenomena among men. For Mencius, when facing others being suffering, it is the ＂not bearing＂ (bu ren) that springs out. For Xunzi, it is the ＂being distributed＂ (you fen) that is summoned by the conflicts from desires of men. ＂Not bearing＂ and ＂being distributed＂ help us clarify the fundamentals of ethical thinking of Mencius and Xunzi without falling into the overpoliticized discourses caused by the realistic need in Pre-Qin. Furthermore, the two keywords, nature and community by refusing the fixed common basic, provide ＂two-fold＂ structure that simultaneously contains homogeneity and heterogeneity, separation and communication. Through these two fundamentals, the article hopes to rethink the traditional connection of ＂nature＂ and ＂commonality＂ and the problematization of the Confucianism schema between ethics and politics.