戴震重建儒學概念的理解與評價

Comprehension and Evaluation: Dai Zhen's Reconstruction of Confucian Concepts

杜保瑞(Bau-Ruei Duh)

《哲學與文化》 32卷11期 (2005/11) Pp. 25-44

https://doi.org/10.7065/MRPC.200511.0025

摘要

本文討論戴震如何以理概念的重新定義，而批評宋明儒學的理論體系，說明戴震本為解決時代弊病而將解決的方案訴諸哲學理論的重構的意義。本文指出，戴震是以即現實操作而有成的論說活動收管價值概念的定義模式，於是天道、理、性、命、情、才、欲、氣等概念皆在即人情節制的操作實踐中以其達至如理狀態而為善性的完成，因此理概念與氣稟說合為一本，戴震並以此一思路批評程朱之以天命之性及氣質之性兩分人性、及以天理及人欲兩分理欲之二本說，以其皆外人性而官天理者。筆者認為，程朱是在討論理概念作為普遍原理的抽象定義的問題，並無外人性說天理的缺失。戴震以為程朱陸王皆由道佛之真宰、真空諸說轉言此理，而以理為外或即已完足而不必作功夫，此實是對於本體論問題及本體功夫問題的完全隔閡所致之批評。本文以說明戴震批評的思路之解讀，與程朱陸王的儒學意見之維護為目標，做詳細說明。

關鍵字

戴震 ； 孟子 ； 朱熹 ； 理 ； 性 ； 道 ； 氣 ； 王陽明 ； 老子 ； 莊子 ； 禪學

並列摘要

This paper is intended to discuss how Dai Zhen criticizes the theory system of Song-Ming Confucianism by redefining the concept of Li (nous) and then to explain what significance Dai Zhen appeals to for reconstructing the philosophical theory as a solution for the initial purpose of removing current maladies. This paper shows that Dai Zhen sums up the modes of defining the concept of value with the practical and effective theoretical process, and therefore the concepts such as Tian-Dao (the way of heaven), Li (nous), Xing (nature), Ming (life), Qing (feeling), Cai (talent), Yu (desire), Qi (dynamics), etc. are all under the control of humane practice, achieving the state of Li (nous) so as to perfect good nature. Dai Zhen hence maintains the monism for the concept of Li (nous) and the theory of Qi (dynamics) as a means to criticize the dualism for human nature divided the nature of Tian-Ming (heavenly destiny) from that of Qi-Zhi (disposition) as well as the dualism for Li (nous) and Yu (desire) divided Tian-Li (natural principles) from Ren-Yu (human desire), which are approved by Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi who emphasize Tian-Li (natural principles) rather than Ren-Xing (human nature). The author of the paper however holds that what Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi concentrate on is the abstract definition of the concept of Li (nous) as the universal principle so there is no defect in emphasizing Tian-Li (natural principles) rather than Ren-Xing (human nature). Dai Zhen considers that Chen Yi, Zhu Xi, Lu Jiuyuan and Wang Yang-Ming's theories of Li (nous) were transformed from ”Zeng-Zai”(真宰) and ”Zeng-Kong” (真空) found in Daoism and Buddhism so as to completely satisfy with Li (nous) and ignore cultivation of the mind in practice. As a matter of fact, Dai Zhen's critique stems from taking apart the problem between ontology and ontological cultivation of the mind in practice. This paper would focus on the analysis of the development of Dai Zhen's critical thinking and a thorough investigation for defending Chen-Zhu-Lu-Wang's Confucianism.

並列關鍵字

Dai Zhen ； Mengzi ； Zhu Xi ； Li nous ； Xing nature ； Dao way ； Qi dynamics ； Wang Yang-Ming ； Laozi ； Zhuangzi ； Zenism