透過您的圖書館登入
IP:52.14.240.178
  • 期刊

對牟宗三詮釋周敦頤言誠體的形上學之方法論反省

A Methodological Reflection on Mou Zong-san's Interpretation of Zhou Dun-yi's Metaphysics of Genuineness

摘要


本文討論牟宗三先生對周敦頤言誠體的形上學的詮釋意見,並提出筆者的方法論反省。牟先生對周敦頤的哲學定位,相當注重本體孙宙論的縱貫型態之形上學定位,亦即注重於提出一套談道德意志所形成的形上學系統,而由誠體概念當之。但是,牟先生認為周敦頤之學仍有不足之處,他認為,《中庸》、《易傳》有孔孟踐仁盡心的主體實踐之前提在,而周敦頤直接從《中庸》、《易傳》談儒家誠的形上學時,卻稍有忽略於這個主體實踐的重點。因此牟先生既肯定周敦頤之誠體有本體孙宙論的動態形上學意味,又強調它必須也是預含有心、神意味的主體活動義,並認為這是周敦頤似有忽略卻實不能忽略之要點。並且,周敦頤言於思之工夫,牟先生也批評似有忽略《孟子》直下本心以言工夫的重點。以上牟先生所論之諸義,筆者皆提出方法論的反省,指出周敦頤哲學並無需即以形上學創作定位之,而是依據《中庸》、《易傳》之形上學系統而講說聖人境界的境界哲學,並因而充滿了談主體實踐的工夫論哲學,所以牟先生以其為本體孙宙論的形上學系統,卻缺乏主體實踐意識的說法,是不必要的。牟先生的關鍵立場即在,北宋儒學的理想型尚未出現,周敦頤系統尚不完美,要在明道一本論的系統中才見出主體實踐義及形上道體發用流行義的圓滿。但是,此說又等於是以聖人境界說形上道體,並不是什麼形上學的圓滿義。總之,牟先生以其自身特殊又曲折的形上學概念定義定位北宋儒學,造成對各家既評價不一又分判優劣,非常干擾學者對宋明儒學的基本認識,筆者遂以孙宙論、本體論、工夫論、境界論的實踐哲學系統與思辨哲學的存有論系統分開討論之,定位周敦頤為境界哲學系統,預設本體孙宙論系統,包含工夫論系統,以此即可免於牟先生的強勢詮釋,而得以準確地認識傳統文本。

關鍵字

誠體 周敦頤 牟宗三 通書 形上學 境界論

並列摘要


This paper discusses Mou Zong-san's interpretative opinions about Zhou Dun-yi's metaphysics of cheng (genuineness and) and offers the writer's methodological reflection. According to Mou, Zhou paid lots of attention to the lengthwise metaphysical position of ontological cosmology, that is, stressing the introduction of a metaphysic framework on moral will, which is informed by the concept of genuineness. But Mou still thought that there was something missing in Zhou's doctrine. For Mou, ”Yi Zhuan,” The Doctrine of the Mean was premised on the Confucian subjective practice of fulfilling jen (benevolence) and developing xin (mind), while Zhou somewhat ignored this point of subjective practice as he talked about the Confucian metaphysics of genuineness in ”Yi Zhuan,” The Doctrine of the Mean. Therefore, while approving Zhou's concept of genuineness for its implication of the dynamic metaphysics of ontological cosmology, Mou stressed that it also had to be a subjective activity with both the mind and the spirit involved, which for Mou was something that Zhou seemed to ignore while he actually couldn't. Besides, Mou also criticized Zhou for what he thought was lacking in the latter's doctrine on thinking. Addressing Mou's criticism, the writer proposes a methodological reflection, pointing out that it's not necessary to define Zhou's philosophy as creation of metaphysics. Zhou's philosophy is indeed the philosophy of realm that discusses the realm of saints, based on the metaphysical system of ”Yi Zhuan,” The Doctrine of the Mean, and therefore it is pervaded with philosophy of cultivation revolving around subjective practice. Accordingly, Mou's criticism about Zhou of missing the consciousness of subjective practice is unnecessary. Mou's key position was: Zhou's system was not perfect, while the ideal sort of Northern-Song Confucianism hadn't emerged. All in all, Mou tried to define and position Northern-Song Confucianism through his own special and twisted idea of metaphysics and thus made inconsistent judgments, which has seriously interfered with scholars' fundamental understanding about Song-Ming Confucianism. Therefore, the writer employs in turns cosmology, ontology, the theory of cultivation, the practical-philosophical system of the theory of realms and the ontological system of speculative philosophy to define Zhou's philosophy as a system of philosophy of realms, assuming the system of ontological cosmology and including the system of the theory of cultivation. In this way, we can avoid Mou's overbearing interpretation and understand traditional texts correctly.

參考文獻


牟宗三(1981)。心體與性體。台北:正中書局。
杜保瑞(2005)。北宋儒學。台北:臺灣商務印書館。
周敦頤(1990)。周敦頤集。北京:中華書局。
勞思光(1990)。新編中國哲學史。台北:三民書局。

延伸閱讀