本研究主要是從「理論建立」的角度,對於中國大陸省級的政治改革,提出一套整體的解釋。筆者提出「政績∕派系」模式,做爲本文的主要解釋架構。在「政績」的表現上,主要包括「小康社會」(經濟發展)和「和諧社會」(社會維穩)兩項,省級的「初始條件」,會讓省級領導人選擇不同的政改模式。在經濟不富裕的省份,領導人主要推動人事制度改革,以追求「和諧社會」的政績;而經濟富裕省份的領導,則傾向推動行政改革,以追求「小康社會」的政績。本文分別用四川、廣東的個案,佐證以上的論點。其次,在江蘇的個案,該省爲富裕省份,但省級領導卻推動人事改革,主因是胡錦濤希望該省能進行這方面的改革,以在東部省份當中,建立一個「和諧社會」的樣版。此外,在「派系」的解釋上,本文認爲採取激進政治改革的省級領導人,都是中央領導人的「派系」,中央領導人和省級領導之間的扈從關係,使得該省份較有可能出現激進的政治改革。中央領導人藉由「派系政治」的運作,來降低改革的風險性,是爲「中國模式」的一大特色。
This paper proposes a ”performance-faction” model in order to generate a comprehensive explanation of political reforms at the provincial level in mainland China. The two primary measures of ”performance” are economic development (xiaokang shehui) and social stability (hexie shehui). The initial conditions in each province are important in determining which aspect of performance is prioritized. Generally speaking, poorer provinces tend to seek social stability through personnel reform, while wealthier provinces tend to pursue further economic development through administrative reforms. The two cases of Sichuan and Guangdong are used to illustrate this claim. However, Jiangsu provides a contrasting case. Although Jiangsu is a wealthy province, it has pushed through personnel reform in response to Hu Jintao's wish to establish a successful example of social stability on the eastern seaboard. The paper also argues that provincial leaders pushing through radical reform all belong to factions controlled by leaders at the center. The patron-client relationship between politicians in the central government and provincial governors is a likely cause of more radical reform at the provincial level. The tendency of leaders at the center use factional politics as a way of reducing risks associated with reform is also an important characteristic of the ”China model”.
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