An Institutional Analysis of Legislative-Bureaucratic Relations: Does the Principal-Agent Framework Work?

立法與行政關係之制度分析：代理人理論之應用與檢討

張其祿(Chyi-Lu Jang)

《中國行政評論》 8卷3期 (1999/06) Pp. 159-175

https://doi.org/10.6635/cpar.1999.8(3).05

摘要

立法與行政互動關係之探討，向來為公共行政研究之一項主要課題。研究者雖已從不同觀點及角度剖析此一問題，但卻缺乏共同性之分析參照架構。近來新制度經濟學派之興起，及其所衍生發展之各種理論與概念架構，如代理人理論，正提了供研究者在分析立法與行政互動關係時，一項有效的分析參照架構。本文之目的在於檢視應用代理人理論於分析立法行政互動關係時之可行性。立法與行政互動關係之各項主要之文獻與理論，如官僚自主理論，議會掌控理論，及政治結構選擇理論，將按其與代理人分析架構之相容性逐一檢討。此外，本文將深入探索委代關係間的制度面相，並藉此為基礎以增進代理人架構在分析立法與行政關係時之應用可行性。對解決立法與行政互動關係間代理人問題之政策建議將基於分析結果提出。

關鍵字

立法與行政關係 ； 制度分析 ； 新制度經濟學 ； 代理人理論 ； 代理人問題 ； 官僚自主理論 ； 議會掌控理論 ； 政治結構選擇理論

並列摘要

One of the most important and abiding issues in the field of public administration is about the relationships between the legislature and the bureaucracy. This issue has been examined by many scholars from a variety of perspectives. The principal-agent theory developed in the New Institutional Economics is one of the major approaches to the analysis of the legislative-bureaucratic relations. The main purpose of this paper is to examine this approach and determine whether this approach does adequately delineate the dynamics of the legislative-bureaucratic relations. Mainstream literatures on the legislative-bureaucratic relations, such as bureaucratic autonomy, congressional dominance, and politics of structure choice, are examined in terms of their compatibility with the principal-agent framework. Furthermore, an analysis focusing on the institutional dimension of the principal-agent framework is conducted in order to improve the applicability of the principal-agent framework in the study of the legislative-bureaucratic relations. Finally, based on the previous analysis, some implications about how to ameliorate the conflict between the principal and the agent are proposed.

並列關鍵字

Legislative-Bureaucratic Relations ； Institutional Analysis ； New Institutional Economics ； Principal-Agent Framework ； Principal-Agent Problem ； Bureaucratic Autonomy ； Congressional Dominance ； Politics of Structure Choice