關於臺灣地方派系研究有兩大重要面向:一是地方派系和國民黨之間的經濟、政治資源交換關係;另一則是地方派系在民主化之後和政黨結盟關係,由一黨化轉變為多黨化。本研究將探討一個過去地方政治研究較為疏忽的面向:司法。司法對於國民黨的侍從主義有兩個意義。一是,作為控制地方派系的工具;另一則是保護侍從主義菁英所引起的貪污腐敗。在民主化之後,台灣的侍從主義發生激烈變化。本論文將探討司法在侍從體系崩潰過程中所扮演的角色。本研究將首先探討台灣司法獨立改革的歷史過程,此部分將分為法院體系和檢察體系,案件分配(事務分配)和人事升遷問題將是討論的重點。司法獨立對於國民黨的侍從體系帶來三個政治效應:國民黨無法用司法來作為處罰地方派系的工具、國民黨無法用司法來保護地方派系的貪污和買票、地方政治人物的被起訴和判刑造成國民黨地方菁英的中斷。
This paper tries to understand the role of judicial independent reform in the process of the breakdown of the Taiwanese clientelist system. The author argues that the decrease of coercion diminishes the ability of the authoritarian party to control and protect its brokers or local politicians. Democratization decreases the role of coercion in politics. The patrons cannot easily use coercion or the legal system to punish their brokers and clients any more after democratization. Without facing the threat of serious punishment, brokers and clients can easily defect from their patrons, challenge their authority, or demand more resources from their patrons. In the meantime, the patrons cannot easily use the judiciary to protect brokers' and clients' illegal activities. A more independent judiciary has had three effects politically on KMT clientelism. First, the KMT could not easily control and punish its maverick clientelist elites. Second, the corrupt clientelist elites' prosecutions and subsequent verdicts caused the discontinuity of KMT local elites. Third, it became more difficult for the KMT to use a more independent judiciary to protect their clientelist elites' vote-buying in elections. Without judicial protection, the KMT political machine could not function well.
為了持續優化網站功能與使用者體驗,本網站將Cookies分析技術用於網站營運、分析和個人化服務之目的。
若您繼續瀏覽本網站,即表示您同意本網站使用Cookies。