本研究旨在探討關係人往來因素對銀行逾期放款比率的影響,遂以1995年至2002年33家本國上市上櫃銀行為研究對象。實證結果發現,新銀行的關係人放款利息收入比率對逾放比具顯著正向影響,而舊銀行的關係人放款比率對逾放比亦具顯著正向影響,故當我國上市與上櫃銀行之關係人放款愈高,道德危機的發生機率增高,致使逾期放款比率確實顯著增高。其次,舊銀行的高階管理者持股比率愈高,其逾放比愈高,因舊銀行多屬官股持股較高的公營行庫,當其管理者握有股權愈多致使其保障愈多,產生浪費資產或怠惰情形更趨明顯,遂對逾期放款比率具有正向影響。最後,新銀行之董監事持股比率對逾放比具顯著負向影響,即新銀行董監事等大股東具有積極監督管理者,以提高公司價值與自身利益的誘因,致使新銀行董監事持股比率愈高,逾期放款比率愈低。
The main objective of this study is to examine the effects of the stakeholders' loans granting on the ratio of non-performing loans of 33 domestic listed and OTC-Listed banks from 1995 to 2002. The empirical results indicate that stakeholders' loans are significantly positively correlated to the non-performing loans of Taiwan listed and OTC-Listed banks. This indicates that the higher the ratio of total loans to related parties of banks is, the higher the probability of moral hazard is and then the higher their non-performing loans will be. In addition, the ratios of senior managers' stocks are significantly positively correlated to the non-performing loans ratio, which implies when senior managers own more stocks, the untrustworthy and inappropriate conducts easily occur, contributing to a higher non-performing loans ratio. Finally, a higher ownership ratio of board of directors and monitors directly lowers the level of non-performing loans ratio due to the active monitoring and self-interest behavior of board members and monitors.