以修訂Lazear之退休理論探討國內勞工退休年齡延長對勞資雙方之影響

A Study on Labor Retirement Age Extension and its Influence on Labor and Owner-A Modification of Lazear's Theory

黃允成(Yun-Cheng Huang) ； 周家漢(Ku-Han Chou)

《管理研究學報》 14卷1期 (2014/06) Pp. 133-168

https://doi.org/10.6626/MR.2014.14(1).05

摘要

經由Lazear之強制退休理論可知，退休時間會隨顧主之薪資調升幅度、勞工之起薪及邊際產值而改變。然而，Lazear未考慮勞工之工作屬性，且假設勞工之邊際產值為一固定常數，顯與現實情況不符。因此，本文除了將勞工概分為知識工作者與體力工作者外，且假設勞工之邊際產值會隨年齡改變，以找出勞工之最適退休年齡。最後以範例驗證及敏感度分析得知，當勞工為具有特殊技能之知識工作者時，若起薪過高或逐年調薪幅度過大，或者勞工之起始產值或邊際產值調整率之增加率越小，則資方較不樂見勞工延退，以免增加資方之負擔；反之，則資方相對較易於接受勞工延退。當勞工為不具有特殊技能之體力工作者時，若起薪過高或逐年調薪幅度過大，或者勞工之起始產值越小或邊際產值調整率之衰退率越大，則資方較不樂見勞工延退，以免增加資方之負擔；反之，則資方相對較易於接受勞工延退。

關鍵字

高齡社會 ； 勞工 ； 退休

並列摘要

According to Lazear's theory of mandatory retirement, retirement age is influenced by employer's salary increasing rate, laborer's starting salary and marginal productivity. However, Lazear ignored laborer's working properties and assume that the laborer's marginal productivity is a constant. Therefore, this paper is assumed that the labors can be divided into knowledge workers and physical labor. And then, laborer's marginal productivity is changed by age. Finally, a numerical example is analyzed and demonstrated to understand. When a knowledge worker has higher initial salary, higher salary increasing rate, lower initial production value, or lower increasing rate of marginal contribution, the employer will not have aspiration to delay the worker's retirement age. In addition, when the worker is a physical labor has higher initial salary, higher salary increasing rate, lower initial production value or higher decreasingrate of marginal contribution, the employer will doesn't have the aspiration delay the worker's retirement age.

並列關鍵字

Ageing Society ； Workers ； Retirement