雜眾的建構：重探一個史賓諾莎的理論論題

在當代政治理論的系譜中，史賓諾莎對雜眾的論述是極為重要的智識脈絡，本文探究「雜眾的建構」此一理論論題，首先藉由史賓諾莎與霍布斯的對比，來說明雜眾的微觀基礎：自然權利（力量）的相洽。在此基礎上，史賓諾莎以雜眾的建構取代了主權肇建。而雜眾的建構涉及史賓諾莎兩次的理論性換位，第一次換位提出雜眾的現實樣態與理想樣態，以及兩者之間擺盪與過渡，對Balibar與史特勞斯來說，由情動性網絡交織而成雜眾，終究使得這樣的過渡無法完成。此一表面上的僵局就需要二度的理論性換位，藉由主動性情動的生成，而非主動情狀對被動情狀的取代，來界定雜眾建構的動力。對情動的重新評估與對「共同」的著力，會是奈格理詮釋史賓諾莎的兩個主要線索。

關鍵字

史賓諾莎；自然權利（力量）；相洽；雜眾；情動性網絡；情動；共同

並列摘要

In the genealogy of contemporary political theory, the conception of multitude in Spinoza is an intellectual source of importance. The present article aims to explore the theoretical thesis of ＂the constitution of multitude.＂ By comparing the doctrines of natural rights of Hobbes and of Spinoza, the first section demonstrates the agreement of natural rights (powers) in Spinoza. Based on the agreement of powers, the multitude as a category of political collectivity replaces the foundation of sovereignty with the constitution of the multitude. There are two theoretical displacements in Spinoza: The first one proposes two modes of multitude and the oscillation or passage between them. But the affective networks weaving the multitude make this passage unattainable, as Balibar and Strauss clarified. For the contemporary thoughts inspired by Spinoza, this seeming impasse requires the second theoretical displacement to determine the dynamics of constitution of multitude by the becoming of active affects, instead of the overcoming of passive affections with active ones. And this is why the reassessment of affects and the emphasis of ＂the common＂ are two major threads in Negri's interpretation of Spinoza.