What Does the Law of Non-Contradiction Tell Us, If Anything? Paradox, Parameterization and Truth in Tiantai Buddhism

不矛盾律是否規定存有論命題：天台佛學知識論中之矛盾說

Brook Ziporyn

《華梵人文學報》 天台學專刊 (2013/05) Pp. 407-454

摘要

本文的問題起源於，要如何理解在大乘佛教文獻中經常看到的詭詞或自相矛盾的論述，也企圖回應近來如Graham Priest, Jay Garfi eld和Yasuo Deguchi，根據 Priest「平行協調邏輯」的說法，主張至少有部份的詭詞不只具有方便或第二諦之地位，而被用作以達成第一諦教學的和救度學的目的，而應更確切地說，它們自身即具有充分絕對的真理之地位，是關於世界的真正事實的正確描述。筆者所要論證的是，根據特別充滿此種弔詭命題的天台宗的教義，上述三位作者對於此問題的提法，根本上是錯誤並會產生誤導的效果。就某個意義而言，我們甚至可以說不是有些詭詞，而是所有的命題皆必須包含自相矛盾的一面，從天台的角度來看的「真實」，「真實」的命題即指由此命題矛盾而導向此命題的自我超越的清楚含義，那也就是說，不僅是部分而是所有的命題皆為矛盾，而藉由自相矛盾而引導出自我超越，以自我指涉之「筏」喻的類似結構，形構了所有佛教的教理。但這明顯的是一種徹底的實踐性的真理觀，而非是任何一種邏輯實證論的或符應論的真理觀。所謂的真理並非是關於這世界之事物的狀態之唯一準確描述，真理在此並沒有本體論上的義涵。本文考察同時具有佛教思想與中國固有哲學傳統之天台認識論的觀念，並且通過此一道路顯示在這些思考中所呈現關於不矛盾律的先驗性格（依康德的含義），它們可以是個循環，但並不支持任何型式的本體論。

關鍵字

天台 ； 矛盾 ； 弔詭 ； 邏輯 ； 筏喻

並列摘要

This paper takes up the question of how to understand the paradoxical or self-contradictory statements often found in Mahayana Buddhist literature, partially as a response to recent works by Graham Priest, Jay Garfield and Yasuo Deguchi which assert, on the basis of Priest’s work on ”paraconsistent logic,” that at least some of these paradoxes be taken not as merely heuristic or conventional truths, used for pedagogical and soteriological purposes, but rather are full-fl edged absolute truths, in the sense of accurate descriptions of real facts about the world. I argue, on the basis of the doctrinal resources of Tiantai Buddhism, where these paradoxes are if anything more than central than in the Mahayana as a whole, that this way of addressing the problem is fundamentally wrong-headed and misleading. In one sense, we may say that not only some, but indeed all, paradoxical statements are, from a Tiantai perspective ”true”-but true here in the distinctive sense of leading precisely to self-contradiction and thus to self-overcoming: all statements (not just some) are contradictions, and by contradicting themselves they lead beyond themselves, in a structure analogous to the self-referential ”raft” parable that frames all Buddhist doctrine. This is, however, obviously a thoroughgoingly pragmatic notion of truth, rather than a logical realist or correspondence notion of truth. These truths do not describe states of affairs about the world; they have no ontological referent. The paper examines the sources of these Tiantai epistemological ideas in both Buddhist thought and indigenous Chinese philosophical traditions, and along the way show how these considerations reveal the purely transcendental character (in Kant’s sense) of the Law of Non-Contradiction itself, which can be shown to be circular and to have no bearing of any kind on ontology.

並列關鍵字

Tiantai Buddhism ； Law of Non-Contradiction ； Paradox ； Upaya ； Logic ； Parable of the Raft

參考文獻

Takakusu Junjirō, Watanabe Kaigyoku, et al. 1924-1934. Taishō shinshūDaizōkyō 大正新脩大蔵経 , (“The Chinese Buddhist Canon”) (“T”), 100 volumes, Tokyo: Taisho Issaikyo Kankokai.

Lawson-Tancred, H.(trans.)(1998).Aristotle's Metaphysics.London:Penguin.

Priest, Graham(1987).In Contradiction, A Study of the Transconsistent.Dordrecht:Martin Nijhoff Publishers.

Priest, Graham(2000).Could Everything Be True?.Australasian Journal of Philosophy.78(2),189-195.

Priest, Graham(ed.),Beall, J.C.(ed.),Armour-Garb, Bradley(ed.)(2007).The Law of Non-Contra-diction.Oxford:Oxford University Press.