本文考慮存在貿易障礙,建立一個兩國雙占廠商模型,探討當廠商生產同質產品且在各個市場從事Cournot數量競爭時,產業內授權廠商的最適授權策略。本文的重點聚焦於研發技術強度(Innovation Size)產生的成本優勢及貿易障礙產生的獨占租(Rent)的作用。本文証明若研發為非劇烈創新,當研發技術強度相對貿易成本夠高時,最適授權策略為混合授權:反之,當研發技術強度相對貿易成本夠低時,最適授權策略為單位權利金授權。再者,本文也証明若研發為劇烈創新,最適授權策略為混合授權。
This paper develops a two-country duopolistic model and takes into account trade barriers in exploring the insider patentee's optimal licensing contract, as firms produce a homogeneous product and engage in Cournot competition in each market. The focus of the paper is on the impact of cost advantage generated by the innovation size and the rent created by trade barriers. The paper shows that mixed licensing contract is optimal as the innovation size relative to the innovation size is large under non-drastic innovation, while royalty licensing is optimal, otherwise. Moreover, it also shows that the optimal licensing contract is mixed licensing under drastic innovation.