本文從核心代理問題的角度,被視台灣上市(櫃)公司股權結構,董事會特性對盈餘管理之關聯性,同時探討機構投資人及外部董事等監督機制之效果。實證結果發現:(1)管理者持股與盈餘管理呈負相關,支持利益收斂假說。(2)控制權與現金流量請求權偏離程度愈大,盈餘管理程度愈大,顯示核心代理問題確會使盈餘管理行為增加。(3)管理者持股比率與盈餘管理存有非線性關係,管理者持股比率在6.25 %以下與盈餘管理呈負向顯著關係,管理者持股比率介於6.25 %-25 %與盈餘管理呈正向顯著關係。(4)控制權與現金流量請求權偏離程度,對盈餘管理的影響僅出現在有調升盈餘動機之樣本,顯示權益代理問題或核心代理問題與盈餘管理的關係,在企業面臨虧損或避免盈餘為負時會較明顯,即管理者或控制股東,會為了達到盈餘門檻使盈餘平滑化,使其有強烈動機進行盈餘管理。(5)盈餘管理會隨董監事股權質押及董事長兼任總經理更加明顯,但能藉由董監持股、機構投資人持股及外部董事比率提高而獲得改善。
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of ownership structure and board characteristics on earnings management from the perspective of core agency problem. In addition, we also investigate the monitoring effect of the institutional investors, and the outside directors. The empirical results indicate as follows. First, managerial ownership is negatively related to earnings management and hence supports convergence of interest hypothesis. Second, when managers of the companies have more control rights than cash flow right, which results in a core agency problem, managers are more likely to manage earnings. Third, the managerial ownership has an U-shape relationship with earnings management. Fourth, the relationship between core agency problem and earnings management becomes evident, when managers use earnings management to avoid earnings decreases or losses. It means that managers have more earnings management behavior before reached the goal of earnings (thresholds). Finally, the pledge ratio of shares of directors and the chief executive officer (CEO) duality have positive relationship with earning management, but the shares of directors, institutional ownership and the number of the outside directors have negative relationship with earning management.