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  • 學位論文

董事資訊揭露不實民事責任之研究─以獨立董事責任規範方式探討為中心

The Research on Civil Liabilities of Directors’ Misrepresentation─Focus on Adjusting Independent Directors’ Liabilities

指導教授 : 林仁光

摘要


二○○六年證券交易法修正,獨立董事制度在公開發行公司正式全面推行,有關獨立董事面臨的責任,也逐漸受到重視。目前獨立董事與其他董事面臨的責任是相同的,不論在責任成立要件或賠償責任方面,均無差別,而司法有關責任認定操作,亦未有明確之區別,然而獨立董事之角色為監督者,其職責與其他董事不同,在資訊取得能力與投入公司經營的時間也有所差異,故責任是否該有所差別,即值得探討。 就董事資訊揭露不實可能導致之民事賠償責任觀之,目前實務上主要著重於證券交易法對投資人之賠償責任,而董事因資訊揭露不實對公司或股東之受託人義務違反責任卻未有規範。因此本文從美國德拉瓦州受託人義務和一九三三年證券法、一九三四年證券交易法,來觀察其就董事資訊揭露不實行為的民事責任,以及受託人義務違反責任和證券詐欺責任之間的關係。兩種責任規範目的不同、保護對象不同,然而不排除同時成立之情形。而在我國,有關董事資訊揭露不實之行為,如造成公司損害,董事對公司會有受託人義務違反之賠償責任,但董事對股東卻因為沒有受託人關係、亦無受託人義務和責任追究之制度存在,所以股東受有損害並無法向董事求償。本文就此建議應該建立董事對股東受託人關係,以及資訊揭露義務,以方便股東尋求救濟,在此情形下,受託人義務與證券交易法第二十條之一有同時成立之可能。 在了解有關證券交易法之相關責任與受託人義務違反責任之後,則須就各國有關獨立董事之責任是如何規範,進行觀察。各國就此具有獨立性之外部董事,在受託人義務違反責任成立要件上,並未有和內部董事不同之規範,而司法責任認定之操作,則會因為案件事實的不同而有差異,對外部董事和內部董事並未總是存在一致性的差別認定。而在責任成立後,董事在制度上可以透過責任限制條款、責任補償約款與責任保險,事先限定賠償範圍,該些制度雖非針對外部董事而設,然具獨立性之外部董事可以透過此些制度規劃訴訟責任風險。 而在我國,有關獨立董事之責任,並無責任上限制度、責任補償約款或普遍的責任保險,讓獨立董事可以事先規劃訴訟風險,而且獨立董事於董事會居於少數,未能主導董事會的決策,在此情形下,要求獨立董事就內部董事主導的決策負責,並不合理。故本文認為目前有在司法責任認定方面,就獨立董事建立與其他內部董事不同責任標準之急迫性與必要性。 另外,針對證券交易法證券詐欺責任、證券法申報書不實責任,就due diligence defense的責任認定,學者整理聯邦法院判決,認為法院就外部董事和內部董事已有不同之責任認定操作標準。此外,若責任成立後,具獨立性之董事在證券詐欺責任、證券法申報書不實責任僅須負擔比例責任,非連帶責任。本文認為美國法院有關免責抗辯之認定可以做為我國證券交易法第二十條之一、第三十二條免責抗辯認定之學習對象,另外在責任分配方面,本文建議第三十二條之文義應做比例責任之解釋,而且建議司法分配責任比例時,就第二十條之一與第三十二條,應該就因果關係進行責任分配,而且應該注意外部董事與內部董事對損害結果的不同因果關係。

並列摘要


With the revision of Securities Exchange Act in 2006, most of public companies are required to set up independent directors in board. There are more and more discussions centering on the liabilities risk that independent directors should face. When directors make misrepresentation, inside directors and independent directors have the same liabilities in first paragraph of section 23 of Company Act and section 20,section 20-1 and section 32 of Securities Exchange Act. However, the roles and responsibilities of independent directors are different from inside directors. Independent directors play the role of monitoring and their responsibilities focus on monitoring the decision-making process in board, not running the business. Moreover, independent directors are not involved in daily operation and depend deeply on inside directors and management to provide information. Therefore, whether independent directors should have different liabilities is a thought-provoking problem. Regarding civil liabilities caused by directors’ misrepresentation, the cases and academic discussions highlight on liabilities in Securities Exchange Act. Not many papers lay emphasis on whether directors also breach fiduciary duties. Owing to this situation, this thesis studies the two different liabilities in U.S. law, and then makes comparison with Taiwan legal system. By comparative study, this paper considers some deficiencies in paragraph one of section 23 of Company Act, including that there are no fiduciary relationship between directors and shareholders and that directors owe no fiduciary duties of disclosure to shareholders. As a result, this paper suggests that we should establish the fiduciary relationship and fiduciary duties of disclosure between directors and shareholders. After the introduction of fiduciary duties in Company Act and disclosure duties in Securities Exchange Act, we will move on to the judicial standard of liability. This paper tries to observe the liabilities of breach of fiduciary duties in U.S. and Japan legal system, especially concentrating on independent directors’ liabilities. These two countries make no difference between independent directors’ liabilities and inside directors’ liabilities, nor do they have formal lesser judicial standard about independent directors. However, when directors breach fiduciary duties with good faith, they can make an agreement with companies in advance to eliminate or limit their liability. Also, if they perform their responsibilities in good faith but still cause the damages to the third person, they can get back their litigation fees or damage compensation from companies. Although independent directors have no different liabilities from inside directors, they can handle their litigation risk in advance through director indemnification and D&O Insurance. About director liabilities in s10b and rule 10b-5, because of enhanced “scienter” requirement, the plaintiff can hardly prove that independent directors meet ”scienter” requirement. On the other hand, the plaintiff will much more easily to prove “scienter” of inside directors. As a result of the difference of proof burden, there is no need to differentiate independent directors’ liabilities. However, about directors’ liabilities in s11 of Securities Act, some academic papers consider that there are different judicial standard between inside directors and independent directors when courts decide whether “due diligence defense” is established. In Taiwan law, independent directors can not handle the litigation risk in advance through indemnification and D&O insurance. Besides, independent directors are minorities in board, inside directors and management predominate companies’ business operation policy. In this situation, independent directors should not be liable for management policy decision. Therefore, this paper suggests that it is necessary and important to establish a different judicial standard of in deciding independent directors’ liabilities of in first paragraph of section 23 of Company Act and section 20-1 and section 32 of Securities Exchange Act. In proportionate liabilities of 20-1 in Securities Exchange Act., courts should allocate damages by every participant causation of damages, and independent directors should differ from inside directors.

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被引用紀錄


林亭妤(2012)。董事責任補償制度之研究〔碩士論文,國立臺北大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://www.airitilibrary.com/Article/Detail?DocID=U0023-2307201215475800

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