政治菁英與分配正義-以第六屆立法委員請助款為例

The Political Elites and Distributive Justice - case study on the allocation of subsidies for the 6th Legislators

郭昆文(Kun-Wen Guo)

指導教授 ： 陳明通

國立臺灣大學/社會科學院/國家發展研究所/碩士(2010年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2010.00316

摘要

本研究對象是政治菁英中的第六屆立法委員，以權力理論作為研究途徑，就權力行使者、行使目標、行使場域、行使工具與資源、行使程序、行使對象及行使後果作權力分析，探求立法委員與請助款的關係，立法委員透過何種權力途徑，使行政機關依照其決定分配資源。
從12,847件立法委員請助款資料，作件數與金額的差異分析。研究結果發現執政黨立委並未取得較多請助款，但無黨聯盟在兩大黨不過半下，成為關鍵權力者，取得較多資源；問政類型屬於企業型或地方型者高於專業型，資深者高於資淺者，黨團幹部高於非幹部；委員會委員或召委均高於其他委員；區域立委高於不分區及僑選立委；非都會型選區高於都會型；選舉競爭激烈選區高於其他選區；參選者高於未參選者；連任者金額略高於未連任者，但件數並無差異。立法委員請助款因其權力大小而有差異。
從權力行使途徑觀察，發現立法委員與部會互動良好者，或採取支持部會策略者，請助款取得成效最佳，適度行使權力刪減預算創造商議空間者次之，利用高層關係、積極遊說者不多且成效較低，採挑戰策略，強烈杯葛預算易致破局，是最差的策略。立法委員影響資源分配因其個人特質不同及權力大小有差異，但不符合分配正義，更重要的是容易喪失依權力分立監督行政的立場。
研究建議，行政機關應將補助款不分活動類或建設類，不論補（捐）助個人、團體或地方政府，按季公布在網站，並附註有無立法委員建議，以透明公開的程序，讓公民參與監督，使國家資源分配符合公共利益及分配正義，防止權力濫用與誤用。

關鍵字

政治菁英 ； 分配正義 ； 立法委員 ； 行政與立法關係 ； 請助款

並列摘要

This research will focus on 6th Legislators among politics elites. Based on Power theory, by analyzing executor of power, target of execution, area of execution, source and instruments of execution, the procedure of execution, object of execution, and consequence of execution, this study discusses the relationship between the allocation of subsidies and the legislators as well as how legislators force administrative department to allocate resource as their desires.
By analyzing the sum and number of cases in 12,847 subsidies cases, this study find out that the ruling party legislators do not get much more subsidies than their colleagues; however, the legislators belong to Non-partisan Union hold the key power and therefore get more resources under the circumstance which neither party takes majority of seats. Furthermore, this study concludes that senior legislators, legislators who server leader of caucus, or hold committee chair, elected legislators (other than seats are allotted to at-large and overseas compatriot members), legislators elected from urban area, winner of competitive campaign got more resources than their peers. Reelected legislators get a bit more subsidies than first-elected peers, but the number of cases for subsidies the reelected legislators got is the same as first-elected peers do. To sum up, the allocation of subsidies based on the power of individual legislators.
This study further finds out that the legislators who maintain good interactive relationship with administrative departments or take the approach of supporting the policies of administrative departments get more subsidies. The legislators who create negotiable atmosphere by threatening to slash budge are second to their peers mentioned above. The legislators who claim their relationship with those in high office and not actively evolved in lobby or those who boycott the budget toughly get the least of resource. Basically, the allocation of subsidies depends on the characteristics of legislators and the power held by legislators. However, this result is inconsistent with distributive justice. Furthermore, it cannot reflect the supervising character of legislators under separation of power principle.
Based on the above research conclusion, this study suggests that the administrative departments shall disclose result of the allocation of subsidies and add footnote to the item which is allocated based on the suggestion of legislators. By making the procedure of allocation more transparent, the public can supervise the allocation. Therefore, the allocation of national resources can be made based on public interest and distributive justice. The abuse of power can be avoided during the procedure of allocation.

並列關鍵字

political elites ； distributive justice ； legislators ； administration and legislature ； allocation of subsidies

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