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  • 學位論文

李扁政府與馬政府時期臺日漁業談判之比較案例研究〜戰略三角理論架構之分析

Fishery consultations between Taiwan and Japan- Comparison of the Administrations of Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou 〜Analyzing on Strategic Triangle Theory

指導教授 : 徐斯勤
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摘要


臺日漁業談判自1996年起歷經17回合,筆者將談判過程區分為李扁政府(前期)、馬政府(後期),比較後發現有顯著不同的變化。前期日本消極被動,商談之意願低落。但後期出現了戲劇性變化,日本史無前例採取主動積極之態度,最終於第17回合會談達成協議。本研究試圖以戰略三角關係理論為架構,採差異法(Method of difference)作比較案例研究,分析李扁政府與馬政府時期的控制變項與差異變項,進而論證臺日漁業協議完成簽訂之最關鍵因素。 2008年馬政府上台後,兩岸關係和解並進一步提升、中國大陸整體性崛起、2010年日中在東海衝突日益加劇,而美國在東海爭端的立場又曖昧不明,值此之際拋出「東海和平倡議」,都為臺日漁業協議簽訂營造良好條件。但整體而言,日本考量到東海危機攸關國家安全利益,臺灣則因地緣政治,進而形成「臺日中」戰略三角的態勢。 臺日漁業談判是圍繞著釣魚台列嶼主權爭議而引發實質的漁權問題,雖然是功能性、事務性的議題,但牽涉到東海權力互動,因此日本以整體戰略利益考量來處理此一議題。畢竟日本實效控制釣魚台周邊海域、臺日並無邦交、整體國力亦不對稱,談判優勢幾乎掌握在日方。雖然從公共政策決策模式上看似非理性,對沖繩的漁業利益亦是不利,然在官邸、外務省主導下,壓制農林水產省及沖繩漁民的意見,仍與臺灣簽訂漁業協議。 本研究運用戰略三角理論解釋「臺日中」三方互動,敵(enmity)友(amity)關係,確認從李扁到馬政府時期發生結構性的變化。在理論意涵部分,印證戰略三角理論,密切互動的三方,在結婚型的戰略三角關係中,處於不利地位的一方(孤雛outcast)確實會因結構關係改變,為了提升自己戰略地位,而改善與其中任一方的關係,因而調整其行動,而其行動乃基於戰略利益考量。

並列摘要


The Taiwan-Japan Fishery Talks have gone through 17 rounds since 1996. The author divided the negotiation process into the earlier period (the Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian government) and the latter period (the Ma Ying-jeou government). After the comparison, we found that there were significant and different changes. In the early days, Japan was passive, unwilling to negotiate. However, dramatic changes have taken place in the later period. Japan has taken the initiative to adopt an active attitude and finally reached an agreement in the 17th round of talks. This study attempts to use the theory of strategic triangle relations as the framework and adopt the Method of difference (study of comparative case) to analyze the control variables and differential variables during the period of the Li-Bian government and the Ma government, and then to demonstrate the most critical factor in concluding of the Taiwan-Japan Fishery Agreement. After the Ma government came to power in 2008, with the reconciliation between the two sides of the strait has further improving, the overall rise of the China, the conflict between Japan and China in the East China Sea intensified in 2010, and the U.S. position is still unclear. On this occasion, and the "East Sea Peace Initiative" was thrown by Ma government, all provide favorable conditions for concluding the Taiwan-Japan Fishery Agreement. However, as a whole, Japan considers that the East China Sea crisis is a matter of national security interest, while Taiwan is due to geopolitical politics and thus "Taiwan-Japan-China" strategic triangle is formed. The Taiwan-Japan Fishery Negotiations triggered the real fishery rights issue concerning the sovereignty dispute over Diaoyutai Islands. Although it was a functional and transactional issue, it involved the interaction of power in the East China Sea. Therefore, Japan deals with this issue with overall strategic interest considerations. After all, Japan’s effective control over Diaoyutai’s sea areas, Taiwan and Japan have no diplomatic relations, the overall national strength is also asymmetric. The negotiation advantage is almost at the Japanese side. Although from the point of view of public policy decision-making that Japan’s decision seems irrational and it is unfavorable to Okinawa’s fishery interests, yet under the dominant of the bureaucrats and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Japan government still signed the fishery agreement with Taiwan regardless of the opinions of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries and the fishermen of Okinawa. This study uses strategic triangle theory to explain the tripartite interaction between Taiwan, Japan, and China, the relationship between enmity and amity, and evidences the structural changes that have taken place from the period of Li-Bian to the Ma government. In the aspect of theoretical meaning, it also justifies said theory among the strategic triangle theory and the close interaction among the three parties. In the Marriage type strategic triangle relationship, the disadvantaged party (outcast) does change due to the structural relationship and improves in order to enhance its strategic position. The relationship with any of them, and thus adjust its actions, and its actions are based on strategic interest considerations.

參考文獻


參考文獻
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