論政府控制金融事業與民營化政策

On the State-controlled Financial Institutions and Privitization Policy

周志榮(Zhi- Rong Zhou)

指導教授 ： 陳志龍

共同指導教授 ： 陳顯武(Hsien-Wu Chen)

國立臺灣大學/社會科學院/國家發展研究所/碩士(2008年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2008.10449

摘要

臺灣自民國68(1979)年起推動一系列的自由化政策。政策的立論點在於經濟學上經濟自由主義或新自由主義的假設─個人自利的理性行為自然促進整體的利益。彼等主張政府應該放任及鬆綁，生產和分配由市場運作，透過價格體系來決定；法律的功能僅在於保障人民財產權及市場交易的秩序。政府對於公營金融事業的自由化，並未遵照憲法增修條文第10條的規定，就公營金融事業，本企業化經營原則，以法律為特別之規定，轉而採取釋出公股之民營化政策。依據「公營事業移轉民營條例」，政府持有公營金融事業之資本額比例未達50%，即視為已完成民營化。這種公營金融事業所有權由國家移轉至民間的私有化過程中，政府持有資本比例雖未達50％，但仍然實質控制的金融事業即本論文研究的對象─政府金融控制事業。受委任經營政府控制金融事業的人員，也如同市場上的經濟人─民間金融機構的大股東，為追求自己的最大利益，同樣利用法律提供的方式─委託書、表決權拘束契約、股東表決權信託等等，並且透過政府整併金融機構的政策與法制架構，或單獨、或與其他大股東成立策略聯盟，以顯然不相稱之持股取得事業經營權；甚至以不法行賄的方法，強烈的展現意圖和行動以影響法規的制訂、解釋、和執行。其結果，一方面造成資本的大型化、集中化、財團化，引起社會內部分配正義的爭擾。另一方面，更使法律陷入難以規範個體間義務和利益衝突的困境，同時加重代理人的道德風險問題。不僅公司治理不彰，金融風險亦益趨擴大。市場失靈，政府必須介入；但政府又經常失靈，無法提供必要的法制架構使市場恢復正常運作。法規範也無法達成保障人民財產權及市場交易秩序的原本目的。本論文旨在研究此現象的背景，緣由，並且透過政府金融控制事業與民間金融事業合作整併、與整併後又非法進行併購的實際案例，嘗試發掘問題之所在，進而在法律規範上尋求可能解決的答案，以滿足吾人所期待最適的公平正義。

關鍵字

放任鬆綁 ； 民營化 ； 政府控制金融事業 ； 實質控制 ； 經濟人 ； 分配正義 ； 市場失靈 ； 利益衝突 ； 代理人問題 ； 政府失靈

並列摘要

A series of liberalization policies were undertaken in Taiwan since 1979. The standpoint of such polices is based on the hypothesis of the liberal theory of economics and Neoliberalism – within the system of capitalism, an individual acting for his own good tends also to promote the good of his community. Therefore, it was argued that the government should deregulate and let market determines the manufacturing and distribution. However, the government failed to act in accordance with Article 10 of The Additional Articles of the Constitution. Pursuant to the Act of Privatization of Government-Owned Enterprises, an originally state-owned financial company will be deemed to finalize the privatization process when its shareholding of the government fell under 50%. Despite the shareholding’s being less than 50%, the government still has substantial control in this kind of financial institutions. Such kind of financial institutions is the main target of our research in the thesis.

The management team of the state-controlled financial institutions, the same as the other Home economicus such as the major shareholder of private financial institutions, would look for their greatest interests by using the methods provided by the relevant laws and regulations, such as proxy, voting agreement, voting trust, etc. They obtained the control of the business with apparently low price, and even manipulated the stipulation, interpretation, and execution of relevant regulations by bribery. As a result, it has caused the capital to be further centralized and eventually led to the dispute concerning the distributive justice. On the other hand, the issues related to conflicts of interest also arose, and the moral hazard of the agents is inevitable. Given the above, the poor corporate governance substantially enlarged the risk of the financial industry. When there is market failure, the government is expected to intervene. However, the government has failure from time to time, and the market cannot function normally absent a sound legal framework to regulate in this regard. The laws and regulations fail to reach its original goals to protect the property rights and maintain market order.

The thesis is aimed to do a study on the background and reasons behind this phenomenon. The author tries to find out the root of the problems by studying the actual cases with respect to the merger and acquisition dealings between the state-controlled financial institutions and private financial institutions, and it is hoped that a resolution can be sought to meet our expectations toward justice and equity.
Key words: deregulate, privatization, state-controlled financial institutions, substantial control, Homo economicus, dictribute justice , market failure, conflict of interests, principal-agent problem, government failure

並列關鍵字

deregulate ； privatization ； state-controlled financial institutions ； substantial control ； Homo economicus ； dictribute justice ； market failure ； conflict of interests ； principal-agent problem ； government failure

參考文獻

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