透過您的圖書館登入
IP:18.118.200.86
  • 學位論文

朱熹思想中的情、理、法

Zhu Xi on Sentiment, Rationality and Rule

指導教授 : 吳展良 黃源盛
若您是本文的作者,可授權文章由華藝線上圖書館中協助推廣。

摘要


長久以來,華人社會似乎有種普遍地對政府法令制度漠然的現象,另一方面,長久以來,華人社會之中一般人民在觸及「違法(形式上法令規範)」之時,經常『不由自主的』浮現且強調「情、理、法」。擺盪於強調「情、理、法」之際的不由自主態度,與華人對於政府法令制度的相對漠然態度之間,有何關連?與上述中國文化社會穩定狀態下的規範信仰有何關連?這些問題令人好奇。然而,近現代我國學者關於法制史的研究,幾乎都以「制度」為主軸,探討法律制度、典章本身或實踐面源由、變遷的現實因素,與相關重要思想家思想論述影響等等,似乎仍未對這一層面多所著墨。 宋以降理學家對於情、理有不同以往的發見、體會。「情、理、法」的探討若及於朱熹思維之間,在其深刻而豐富的著述、影響力至清末仍不衰的情況下,或有可觀學術成果可供發掘。在此行文主要議題:以心性論與工夫論所連接的朱熹理學軸線,詮釋、分析朱熹思想內部的情、理、法觀念之間,有否指涉、隱含一種規範概念形式上「法(律)」的概念形式僅居次要的理解?該規範概念形式所涉的整體理解中,「情」、「理」與「禮」、「道德」有何牽連? 本文共分五章;除了首章緒論及末章結論之外,主要論述分為三章。其中,略分為「情—理」與「理—法」兩探討階段,分列第二章、第三章討論。 第二章首先介紹先秦儒(以四書為主)的情理交融論述、修養次第境界。《論語•泰伯》的「興於詩,立於禮,成於樂」應可認孔子提出了從素樸情感狀態經德行進階至美善情感的次第;達「成於樂」者,人心中天理與情欲融合在一起,天理便以情的狀態流出。其次,探討朱熹「心性」之間的主宰理念與以道心為主宰的情理交融狀態,「天理人欲,同行異情」,以道心為主宰則為聖人之情、以人心嗜欲為主宰則得常人之情。面對「心所發為情,或有不善」的氣稟之蔽,如何從心主宰修養過程動靜面著手?朱熹認為其間終極工夫為《中庸》上的中和工夫。 第三章首先探討「禮」在執中工夫階段的意義,朱熹認《論語•顏淵》的「克己復禮」、「非禮勿視/聽/言/動」作為修養工夫、為學上的「定本」,又說「非禮勿視/聽/言/動」是「勝私復禮之機」、「非至明不能察其幾」,最是關鍵;其中的「禮」是天理之節文兼人事之儀則,人心道心惟精惟一,義理之性教自己動輒以「非禮勿視/聽/言/動」揮止禁約其私欲,便能復得天理之節文(禮)而回歸天理之自然。工夫修養脈絡下的「禮」無論就其概念意義或理論定位而言,皆與天理不可分。至於面對儒家經典所呈現「禮樂刑政」的理想境界,唯有入世且堅毅一貫的如儒士,方能復得繼天立極、道統道學合一的相當於二帝三代盛世階段。關於其他制度型態,分別就單論刑法與泛論的「刑政」兩點探討:單論刑法部分,刑法是禮法的附庸,其功能主要在嚇阻人民行為不檢、為惡;泛論「刑政」部分,「刑政」只是為政者治民的工具,至多只能使人民畏於威權,無以感發人心,無法論其心性工夫之證驗。 關於情、理、法所涉義理部分已簡要呈現如第二、三章所述。而第四章續介紹朱熹對於「情、理、法」的理想搭配與齟齬時的敘述,包括摘錄《儀禮經傳通解》上經典敘述與註解作為實例。又探究情、理與律令、刑法的齟齬部分,本文討論「情重法輕/情輕法重/情法相當」認其輕重評價之所出,在於人情及其背後的理(情理),律令、刑法則是作為被衡量的客體。又若執法者直接本於律令、刑法,無視於下工夫,則會被朱熹評為法家、酷吏般慘酷深刻之流;相對的,舜「竊負而逃」其愛親之心勝,行為合符於天理的親情流露,而得「聖賢之心」。 最後,總結朱熹說法指出:若情、理、法的「法」指朱熹理解下的禮法,則建構出一個權衡立論、兼具「天理之節文」內涵與「人事儀則」實體的道德體系與人間秩序,禮才是根本規範。若「法」指朱熹理解下的王法/國法等刑政部分,則是勾勒出一個「明刑弼教」現象,此際,情、理可想而知所呈現的無非是「教」的部分、俗稱的「禮教」;而律令、刑法若非依附於「明刑弼教」而間接具合(天)理之基礎,即是統治者治理人民的工具,以道德本位的立場而論,律令、刑法無法感發人心,在規範上只能居於次位。

並列摘要


Under the common appearance that the Chinese treats governmental rules indifferently since long time, what is the normal belief that keeps Chinese community in stable? What is the “fundamental” normal system in the Chinese, and what is its reference to governmental rules? Furthermore, “Qing(情), Li(理), Fa(法) (sentiment, rationality/principle/reason/nature, and rule)” appears before many Chinese’s eyes spontaneously while people offend against some government rules, referring to the word “illegality”. What is the reference between the spontaneousness on these concepts and the indifference on governmental rules? It’s an interesting question. However, present-day local academics on Chinese legal history almost focalize on “institution” in Imperial China, diving into the governmental rules or institutions themselves. They might dip into practical origins and realistic elements of rules movements, and those who were affected by someone’s influence with his ideas. But it seems that present-day local studies do not extend to the aspect within the questions either. The Confucian School of Idealists after Song Dynasty played an outstanding and remarkable role on constructing or interpreting the conception of “Qing Li”. There may be some considerable fruitage explored if the study on “Qing, Li, Fa” stretched to Confucian School of Idealism, particularly in the influence of Zhu Xi’s insightful, religious and copious writings lasted until late Qing. This thesis compresses the related questions into the statement as fallows: did “Qing, Li, Fa” appeared in Zhu Xi’s writings refer to (or imply to) a system that people regard governmental rule as the back burner in the normal system? If so, what is the content? This thesis comprises five chapters. The first chapter, chapter 1, is a preface, which illustrates the motives, literature discussions, and methods of this research, and the last chapter, chapter 5, makes a summary conclusion. Besides, the main part is as fallows: Chapter 2 is attentive to the relationship between sentiment and rationality. Section 1 briefs on the discussion of blending feelings with human nature in Pre-Ch'in Confucians, especially in The Four Books, as well as the process and realm of self-cultivation. In Confucian Analects, Confucius said, “Prosper with poems, stand with rituals, accomplish with music.” It may be considered that Confucius advanced the self-cultivating approach showing the progress from native sentiment, through moral conduct, and until sublime sentiment. While reaching the gradation of “accomplish with music”, man could blend rationality into sentiment and breathed his chord naturally. Section 2 treats Zhu Xi’s theory of will-nature (the will dominates nature and feeling). The sentiment out of the Daoxin (道心, rational will), which may be named “the sage’s sentiment”, is dualistic to that out of the Renxin(人心, mortal will), which may be named as “laical sentiment.” Facing to mortal obstacles in mind, how did one cultivate himself with watching any body movement? Zhu Xi took the approach called “Zhong He (中和, mean/equilibrium and harmony) as the extreme approach. Chapter 3 is concerned with the issue whether rules (“Fa”) are founded upon rationality. Section 1 focuses on the meaning of “rituals” (as principles) in the practice of “Zhong He” approach. Zhu Xi regarded “To overcome one’s-self and then recover the ritual field of nature reaches Ren(仁). (Self-ritualization, which is nearly corresponded to self-legislation, reaches morality.)” and its imperative “Never act except according to ‘rituals’ (corresponded to moral laws, or principles, as well as mortal laws concurrently).” as the categorical self-cultivating meta-approach. He also considered that the categorical imperative, “Never act except according to rituals,” is the hinge or critical point among self-ritualization. While someone’s rational will dominates his mortal will frequently with the categorical imperative, “Never act except according to rituals,” he would accomplish the self-ritualization. Section 2 illustrates the kingdom of patterns. Zhu Xi accentuated that only Confucians with engaged unswerving faith could realize the kingdom of patterns descript in Confucian classics, practicing Daoxue(道學) at the completely governmental field to unify the political orthodoxy into Confucian orthodoxy. Section 3 examines governmental rules, criminal rules included. Criminal rules, which were positioned functionally as the threatening to people away form wrongdoing, were dependent on ritual rules and titular on the morality. Governmental rules, irrelevant to the self-cultivating approach, were merely tools of governors with the effect of authority, and could not consequently cultivate people. Chapter 4 makes a brief introduction on Zhu Xi’s concrete discourse on “Qing, Li, Fa”, including the ideal and discord examples. This thesis concludes that, in Zhu Xi’s view, if the “Fa” above “Qing, Li, Fa” refers to ritual rules, it will be constructed a moral law system accompanied with mortal law system, which would be based on the concept of “equity”. On the contrary, if “Fa” refers to governmental rules, it may draw a blueprint of inculcating with penalty in order to keep Confucianism; by the way, “Qing, Li” points toward the doctrine of Confucianism, which is commonly referred to as “ritual doctrine/discipline” in last hundreds of years. If governmental rules exist without any Confucian purpose, they may be treat as tools of governors. Moralistically speaking, governmental rules are regarded as the back burner due to irrelevance to the self-cultivating approach.

參考文獻


黃進興,1984.11 〈所謂「道德自主性」:以西方觀念解釋中國思想之限制的例證〉,食貨月刊,14:7/8,台北:食貨月刊社。
林端,2003 《韋伯論中國傳統法律-韋伯比較社會學的批判》,台北:三民。
劉錦賢,2006.6 〈儒家圓成之德教論述—興於詩,立於禮,成於樂〉,興大中文學報,19,台中:中興大學。
莊世同,2005.12 〈人文精神、守法意識與法治教育〉,政治與社會哲學評論,15,台北:巨流。
莊世同,2002.6 〈法律的規範性與法律的接受〉,政治與社會哲學評論,1,台北:巨流。

延伸閱讀