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  • 學位論文

併購溢價與控制權關聯-以證券交易所併購為例

Stock Exchange’s Control Premium in Mergers and Acquisitions

指導教授 : 王全三

摘要


過去僅有Hasan, Schmiedel (2010)以多元迴歸研究交易所併購樣本,其餘皆以個案探討。且多數以交易所併購為研究對象之文獻,研究目的在預期綜效如何反映至主併交易所宣告期間異常報酬,少有研究併購溢價。本研究考量交易所股東之顧客控制型特徵,以多元迴歸方式,檢驗不同支付方式所造成之不同控制權能力,是否為併購溢價之可能因素。 本研究在敘述性統計結果發現,初次出價相較被併交易所前四周收盤價之平均溢價約為14.61%,小於一般產業之平均溢價。主併交易所支付之對價中,以現金支付之比例69.30%,高於以股票支付之比例30.70%。預期併購後被併交易所控制權平均約為9.57%,表示大部分被併交易所併購後仍有取得部分控制權。欲購被併交易所股權比例平均約為42.81%,顯示主併交易所原先可能少部分持有被併交易所,日後僅須再購入其餘部份。另外,被併交易所之股東權益無論是以帳面或市價評價,皆小於主併交易所之規模。 本研究在多元迴歸結果發現,控制預期併購後被併交易所控制權、主併與被併交易所規模、被併交易所P/B、欲購被併交易所股權比例,主併交易所若以現金支付,則須付較高溢價,信心水準為94.28%。但若將溢價及主併、被併交易所股東權益等變數,以不同方式衡量,則以上結果轉為不顯著或與預期相反。彙總以上,本研究以多元迴歸方式分析,推論主併交易所若以現金支付,則須付較高溢價,但無法得出穩健之結果。

關鍵字

證券交易所 併購 控制權 溢價

並列摘要


Few researchers focus on stock exchange’s mergers and acquisitions. Furthermore, most of them emphasize the relationships of merger synergies and abnormal returns. Few of them study the merger premiums. We apply the multiple regressions on 39 stock exchange’s mergers and acquisitions from 1996 to 2011 to investigate the merger premiums. The finding of descriptive statistics suggests the merger premiums of stock exchanges are lower than general firms. Bidding stock exchanges pay more premiums if they pay with cash, instead of stock, to target stock exchanges. Bidding stock exchanges bought shares of target stock exchanges in stages. Target stock exchanges reserve part of control over bidding stock exchanges after mergers and acquisitions. The sizes of bidding stock exchanges are larger than target stock exchanges’ sizes measured in book or market value of equity. The finding of multiple regressions suggests that merger premiums will be higher if bidding stock exchanges pay with cash, instead of stock, to target stock exchanges. However, this finding is sensitive to different proxies of merger premiums and stock exchange’s sizes.

參考文獻


Aggarwal, R. and S. Dahiya (2006). "Demutualization and Public Offerings of Financial Exchanges." Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 96-106, Summer 2006.
Chemmanur, T. J. and P. Fulghieri (2006). "Competition and cooperation among exchanges: A theory of cross-listing and endogenous listing standards." Journal of Financial Economics 82(2): 455-489.
Dong, M., D. Hirshleifer, et al. (2006). "Does Investor Misvaluation Drive the Takeover Market?" The Journal of Finance 61(2): 725-762.
Eckbo, B. E., S. Betton, et al. (2009). "Merger negotiations and the toehold puzzle." Journal of Financial Economics 91(2): 158-178.
Eckbo, B. E. and H. Langohr (1989). "Information disclosure, method of payment, and takeover premiums: Public and private tender offers in France." Journal of Financial Economics 24(2): 363-403.

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