影響美國銀行業庫藏股宣告規模因素之再探討

A Reexamination of Magnitude of U.S. Bank Holding Company Share Repurchase Announcement

賴慧璟(Hui-Jing Lai)

指導教授 ： 劉啟群

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/會計學研究所/碩士(2008年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2008.10588

摘要

自九零年代起，美國銀行業逐漸從事庫藏股買回活動。但由於銀行業的特性與政府高度管制等因素，過去相關研究大多將銀行業的樣本排除在外。
本研究探討於1994年至2006年間，影響美國380家銀行業庫藏股宣告規模之因素。影響庫藏股宣告規模的因素包括:股利替代、傳遞股價低估、管理資本適足率、解決自由現金流量的代理衝突、抵禦併購意圖。此外，亦架構三個新的因素，包括:景氣循環、會計放款違約評價變數及放款類型組合。
實證結果顯示，當銀行所支付的股利愈多、或銀行擁有波動較大的現金流量、或銀行規模較大、或銀行資本適足率較高、或銀行所擁有較多的現金、或銀行面臨被併購的威脅、或銀行業正處於繁榮時期時，其庫藏股的宣告規模愈大。

關鍵字

銀行業 ； 庫藏股宣告規模 ； 股利替代 ； 風險 ； 傳遞股價低估 ； 資本適足率管理 ； 自由現金流量之代理衝突 ； 抵禦併購 ； 景氣循環 ； 會計放款違約變數 ； 放款類型組合

並列摘要

Since the 1990s, bank holding companies started to engage in the repurchase activities. Whereas, there is not a rich literature on bank repurchases because of their quasi-public character and highly regulated by government.
In this paper, using a sample of 380 bank holding companies in the United States from 1994 to 2006, I examine how each motivation affects the magnitude of share repurchase announcements. Motivations include the following: to substitute for dividends; to signal stock is undervalued; to manage capital adequacy ratio; to solve the agency costs of free cash flow; to deter the takeover threat. Besides, there are three newly-constructed motivations: business cycle influence, accounting loan default variables, and loan composition.
Empirical results show that bank holding companies will announce larger magnitude of share repurchase programs when the dividend payout ratios are higher; when have more volatile cash flows; when sizes are larger; when capital adequacy ratios are higher; when have more cash in hand; when under takeover threat; when banking industry is during the boom period.

並列關鍵字

Bank holding company ； Magnitude of share repurchase announcement ； Substitution ； Risk ； Signaling ； Capital adequacy regulation ； Free cash flow ； Takeover ； Business cycle ； Accounting loan default variables ； Loan composition

參考文獻

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