從習近平主政後對台政策析論兩岸關係的發展(2012-2014)

A review of Taiwan policy to cross-strait relations development after Xi Jingping ruled(2012-2014)

周書廷(Shu-Ting, Chou)

指導教授 ： 潘錫堂

共同指導教授 ： 郭展禮

淡江大學/國際研究學院/中國大陸研究所碩士班/碩士(2015年)

https://doi.org/10.6846/TKU.2015.00560

摘要

兩岸關係的發展，在1949年之後政府遷台，雖然只分治短短六十多年，但透過早期國共兩黨的思想、教育控制，兩岸人民的國家認同早已南轅北轍，
深究中共對台政策之歷史脈絡不難看出，中共持績堅守「一個中國」及「和平統一、一國兩制」的原則，但中共隨著國內外環境的變遷不斷修正及調整對台策略。因此，探討不同領導人時期中共對台政策，可藉以瞭解中共對台政策的歷史差異與政策價值的延續性。
2008年，台灣二次政黨輪替，國民黨重新獲得執政的權力，由馬英九總統所領導的政府團隊，致力推動兩岸和解的制度化，希望建構一個互利共贏的兩岸新關係。但看似一帆風順的交流，卻因海峽兩岸服務貿易協定的簽屬問題，引發抗爭，稱太陽花學運，學生占領國會長達23天，中共內部普遍認為這是對台灣讓利許多的協議，竟引發這麼大的抗爭活動，我想這絕對對兩岸關係會造成衝擊。
2014年底台灣九合一選舉，執政的國民黨選舉結果相當慘烈，將影響台灣藍綠兩陣營的勢力消長，首當其衝的將反映在2016台灣總統大選的選票上面，長期與國民黨具有合作基礎的中共政府，是否有必要調整對台政策，對於台灣政局有可能出現的改變做好防範措施。
習近平上台以後作風強硬，對台方針仍是和平統一、一國兩制，但他仍有提出新的方向也就是三中一青，習近平的手段是否有辦法改變台灣民眾普遍不信任中國的態度，在2016年的台灣選舉選票是一個很好的檢視指標，未來的兩岸關係是停滯還是前進2016年就是關鍵。

關鍵字

習近平 ； 兩岸關係 ； 太陽花學運 ； 國民黨 ； 民進黨

並列摘要

After the Republic of China (R.O.C.) regime moved to Taiwan in 1949, the development of the cross-strait relationship had gone poles apart. Even though it only has been 60 years or more, national identities of two states had become entirely different because both of the parties, the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), adopted entirely different ways of ruling in education and controlling ideologies in the mid-20th century.
CCP’s Taiwan policies always insist on “One China Policy”, “Peaceful Unification”, and “One Country, Two Systems” principles. Under these principles, the CCP keeps adjusting its Taiwan policies to adapt domestic and international environments. Therefore, we could understand historical divergences and continuity of policy values of CCP’s Taiwan policies by investigating CCP’s leaders’ behaviors and policies in each period.
In 2008, Taiwan experienced the second time of party alternation in which the KMT took its power back again. Under the President Ma’s regime, the government had tried to focus on institutionalizing the cross-strait relationship in order to construct a new mutual-beneficial relationship across the strait. Everything seemed going successfully until a student protest, called “Sunflower Movement”, occurred in 2014 after the Ma’s regime announced that a cross-strait service trade agreement is going to be signed. Student occupied the Legislative Yuan for 23 days to suspended the agreement. The CCP was surprised that such an agreement which was considered beneficial to Taiwan was strongly opposed. The Sunflower movement, in my opinion, definitely impacted the cross-strait relationship.
The result of the “9 in 1 election” at the end of 2014 in Taiwan did not went well for the KMT. The fiasco of the KMT not only reflected the balance between pan-green and pan-blue coalitions got broken, but also became a possible outcome in the 2016 presidential election. The CCP which has cooperated with the KMT for a long time has to re-consider and to adjust its Taiwan’s policy in response to another possible party alternation occurring in Taiwan.
Xi Jinping’s Taiwan policies are still remaining “Peaceful Unification” and “One Country, Two Systems” principles. But he proposed a new direction for the cross-strait relationship. Whether this new direction could change the distrustful attitude from Taiwanese people toward China will be proved by the outcome in the 2016 presidential election. In summary, 2016 will be the key year deciding whether the future of the cross-strait relationship will move forward or remain stagnating.

並列關鍵字

Xi Jingping ； cross-Strait relations ； Sunflower Movement ； KMT ； DPP

參考文獻

5. 王全毅，中共對台政策之研究(2002~2006)(淡江大學中國大陸研究所，碩士論文，2012年6月)，頁12。

11. 孫豪，中共對台政策的持續與變遷(淡江大學中國大陸研究所，碩士論文，2012年6月)，頁14。

28. 顏建發，習近平對台政策的可能架構與內涵，《台灣國際研究季刊》第9卷第4期，頁 39-61。

24. 顏建發，「習近平對台政策的可能架構與內涵」，台灣國際研究季刊，2013，http://www.tisanet.org/quarterly/9-4-2.pdf，瀏覽日期：2015年4月5日。

參考文獻