經濟制裁對美國軍事衝突可能性之效力
以經濟計量學途徑

現今國際社會基於先進武器毀滅力量強大，不敢輕啟戰端，但是基於國家安全的考慮.，又不能放棄建立符合國家利益與安全的環境，在這樣兩難的情況下，經濟制裁成了較為可行之維持國家利益的途徑。美國對於經濟制裁的運用，由來已久，基於維護民主體制、保護人權、嚇阻不友善國家、恐怖主義以及防止核武擴張等理由。第二次世界大戰結束後，美國成為國際上使用經濟制裁最頻繁的國家。從1960年代起，關於經濟制裁的文獻迅速累積。經濟制裁包含了，對被制裁國的懲罰或是傳送訊息給國際社會的象徵性意義；對國際道德發出警示法律上意義；也有滿足大眾對此行動的期望或經濟需要的制裁國國內意義。制裁國在考量是否出動軍事衝突的過程中，除了國內政治的影響之外，對於未來的衝突可能也是重要的參考因素。主要是在考慮當決定施予經濟制裁的時候，未來與被制裁國的關係、這時候爭端的特質、以及緊張關係的程度不同、未來展開衝突是否對制裁國本身有利，當將成為考量的因素。眾多因素交織下，盼能從中看出經濟制裁後續引發戰爭之原因，以及經濟制裁之於軍事暴力衝突怎樣的關係。經濟制裁與軍事衝突的關係，怎麼樣的情況會使經濟制裁無法有效降低軍事衝突的發生？倘若當經濟制裁缺乏效力，並且緊張關係不停攀升時，正面的軍事衝突是否就會因應而生?由古至今，美國在絕大多數經濟制裁中擔任制裁國的角色，對於經濟制裁後續影響之研究，著實為當今我們必須好好深入的課題。儘管經濟制裁於第二次世界大戰後，廣泛的被各國所用，不過關於其抑制戰爭效力的有無，卻是眾說紛紜。本文主要在探討經濟制裁與軍事衝突間的關係，在怎麼樣的規模及強度的經濟制裁會導致軍事衝突的發生怎麼樣的規模及強度的經濟制裁又會有效的避免軍事衝突？運用經驗法則與實證研究出來的結果做比較，估算出將衝突可能性降到最小之數值

關鍵字

經濟制裁；軍事衝突；經濟計量學途徑

並列摘要

The power of the weapon in this generation is getting stronger and stronger. Pushing every country to think about other way to solve the international dispute without military conflict. Economic sanctions become a good option for this situation. The United State has become the country which use economic sanctions mostly as a tool on foreign affaire. Since 1960, the document and the literature of economic sanctions has getting more and more important. It includes many different point of view to descried and analyze economic sanctions. From the sender’s point of view, sanctions are meant as a tool to prevent conflict. Having failed at diplomacy, the sender must choose between war and capitulation. Sanctions provide an intermediate position which signals to the target the sender’s resolve. If sanctions are too light, then there may be a high probability of conflict due to the utter loss of reputation of the sender and the hardening of the attitude of the target. Light sanctions will be seen as weakness and conflict will then be needed to shore up this perceived weakness. Heavy sanctions can also be associated with a high probability of conflict. Indeed a straight out blockade of a target may be thought of as low intensity conflict itself. However, from the target’s point of view, conflict may be the only recourse in the face of extreme sanctions that threaten the regime. Seen in this way, the intensity of sanctions is not monotonically related to the likelihood of conflict. Low sanctions lead to high probabilities of war, while stiff sanctions also lead to a high probability of war. In this thesis we try to find the cost of the target which can make the lowest probability of military conflict through binary logit model and ordered logit model. Make useful suggestions to the similar research in the future.

並列關鍵字

Economic Sanctions ； Military Conflict ； Econometric Approach

參考文獻

Kaempfer, William H. and Anton D. Lowenberg, “The Theory and of International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Approach,” American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 4, (September 1988), pp. 786-793.

Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of the Negotiations (Washing, D.C.: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1996).

Baldwin, David A., Economic Statecraft (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985).

Collins, Joseph J. and Garbrielle D. Bowdoin, Beyond Unilateral Economic Sacntions: Better Alternatives for U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999).

Cortada, James N. and James W. Cortada, U.S. Foreign Policy in the Caribbean, Cuba, and Central America (New York: Praeger Publisher, 1985).

國際替代計量

經濟制裁對美國軍事衝突可能性之效力以經濟計量學途徑

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