歐洲聯盟對卡特爾管制行政程序之研析－兼論LCD和DRAM卡特爾案

The Analysis of the Administrative Procedure of EU Cartel Regulation - LCD and DRAM Cartels as Examples

謝振庭(Jen-Ting Hsieh)

指導教授 ： 曾秀珍

共同指導教授 ： 苑倚曼

淡江大學/國際研究學院/歐洲研究所碩士班/碩士(2012年)

https://doi.org/10.6846/TKU.2012.01278

摘要

卡特爾（cartel）為寡占市場下產生之商業組織，其聯合壟斷價格、限制產出、瓜分市場，以消除事業間彼此競爭，進而讓消費者權利受損。除此之外，無須彼此競爭的企業更失去研發新產品之動力，為經濟效益帶來損失。為此，歐盟競爭法近年來已將卡特爾列為重點管制目標。
尤於卡特爾隱匿特性，歐盟採用寬恕減免方案（leniency programme），以卡特爾成員中第一位向歐盟執委會自陳者罰鍰全免為誘因，鼓勵企業揭發自身參與之卡特爾。除此之外，執委會希望寬恕減免方案能同和解程序（settlement procedure）一併使用，冀望卡特爾成員能積極配合，加速執委會結案。
LCD 和 DRAM 屬於高科技產業，其製造商集中於台、日、韓幾家製造商手中，屬於寡占市場。其事業為避免競爭壓力而以秘密協議之方式，聯合壟斷 LCD 及 DRAM 市場。經人為哄抬價格後的 LCD 與 DRAM 兩項產品外銷至包含歐盟在內的全球市場，因而對歐盟內部市場帶來不良影響，故適用歐盟競爭法。本文以上述兩案為例，闡述歐盟競爭法如何適用於此兩案件。

關鍵字

歐盟競爭法 ； 卡特爾 ； 寬恕減免方案 ； LCD ； DRAM

並列摘要

A cartel, which rises from the oligopolistic markets, is a business organization that fixes prices, limits outputs or shares the market in order to eliminate competition among competing undertakings to the detriment of customers. In addition, having undertakings free from competition in a given market amounts to the lack of incentives for them to innovate and the whole economy suffers at the end. In response to this negative phenomenon, the EU competition law has made regulating cartels one of its priorities in the recent decades.
Due to the secretive nature of cartels, the EU adopts the leniency programme as a mean to encourage the cartel members to whistle-blow and admit liability to the EU Commission in order to gain immunity from fines. In addition, the
Commission hopes the settlement procedure can work hand in hand with the leniency programme so as to provide incentives for cartel members to cooperate and accelerate the closing of the case.
The making of LCD and DRAM can be regarded as a high-tech industry, whose manufacturers are highly concentrated in the hands of few Taiwanese, Japanese and Korean undertakings and thus the market constitutes as an oligopolistic market. The undertakings in both industries fixed prices and limited output of the products in a secretive agreement for fear of fierce competition. The conduct triggered the application of EU competition law because the products with artificially high prices were sold into global market, including the EEA, bringing a negative impact to it. The article illustrates how the two cartel cases fit into the category of the violation of EU
competition law.

並列關鍵字

EU competition law ； cartel ； leniency programme ； LCD ； DRAM

參考文獻

DOJ : “Fourth Chi Mei executive agrees to plead guilty and serve jail time for participating in global LCD price-fixing conspiracy”, Press Release, 4, August, 2010; DOJ : “Sixth Samsung executive agrees to plead guilty to participating in

DRAM price-fixing cartel”, Press Release, 19, April, 2007.

D’Hespeel L. (2010), “EU”, in Samantha J Mobley and Ross Denton (eds.), Global Leniency Manual 2010, New York: OUP.

Unfinished Concept”, Texas International Law Journal, Vol. 42, pp 430-439.

Combe, E. (2006), “Quelles Sanctions contre les Cartels?”, Revue Internationale de Droit Economique, Vol. 20., pp 11-46.