經理人特質、現金持有對公司價值的影響

本研究以經理人特質之角度，檢視公司現金持有對其價值之影響。在研究方法使用上，係採用Tong (2011)提出之現金持有量的模型。其中，經理人特質係以經理人持股、經理人薪酬與CEO二元性作為代理變數。實證結果發現經理人持股與現金持有之交乘效果對於公司價值呈負相關，顯示當公司經理人持股較高時，易產生反接管行為，使經理人對公司的認同度減少，進而降低公司價值。另外，CEO二元性與現金持有之交乘效果呈現正相關，意味著當董事長兼任總經理時，可以降低公司內部資訊不對稱之問題，較能提升公司價值。

關鍵字

經理人持股； CEO二元性；現金持有；公司價值

並列摘要

The purpose of this research is to study the influence of the interactive effect between manager characters and cash holdings on Firms’ Value. In addition, we use marginal pricing model suggested by Tong (2011) as a research method to analyze the cash holdings, we take the Managers Ownership, Managerial Remuneration and CEO Duality as proxy variables to evaluate the manager characters. The empirical finding shows that Managers Ownership and Cash Holdings on the Firms’ Value have a negative correlation and easily result in the anti-takeover behavior when the company managers hold higher shares, so that the company's managers will lower the degree of acceptance to their companies, and furthermore reduce the Firms’ Value. The synergistic effect between CEO Duality and Cash Holdings performs positive correlation on the corporate value, this might imply that it will lower internal information asymmetry and raise the Firm’s Value when the corporate president serves as general manager at the same time.

並列關鍵字

Managers Ownership ； CEO Duality ； Cash Holdings ； Firms’Value

參考文獻

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國際替代計量

經理人特質、現金持有對公司價值的影響

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