生命哲學與荒誕邏輯:卡洛爾《愛麗絲夢遊仙境》與《愛麗絲鏡中奇遇》的德勒茲式閱讀

Biophilosophy and the Logic of Nonsense: A Deleuzian Reading of Lewis Carroll's Two Alice Books

蔣裕祺(Yu-Chi Chiang)

指導教授 ： 邱漢平

國立臺灣師範大學/文學院/英語學系/博士(2012年)

摘要

本論文檢視路易斯‧卡洛爾《愛麗絲夢遊仙境》與《愛麗絲鏡中奇遇》兩本小說中的荒誕邏輯。在視荒誕邏輯為卡洛爾生命哲學的前提下，本文討論卡洛爾如何引發愛麗絲奇遇旅程中語言、主體性及時空記憶的荒誕，以達到顛覆愛麗絲的目的。
時至今日，荒誕學派仍有大量文獻將卡洛爾兩本愛麗絲小說中的荒誕讀成封閉、自我指涉的語言系統。這本論文有別於以往讀法之處，在於檢視生命哲學與荒誕邏輯之間被忽略的關係。鑒於本研究所採取的理論立場，以及上述領域現狀的簡要回顧，本研究探索的問題是：荒誕邏輯在卡洛爾生命哲學的建構中，是否扮演重要角色?為了回答這個問題，我們假設眩暈效果是在愛麗絲的人類有限性之力衝擊到未然夢境中非人無限性之力時產生，而闖入的域外所造成的皺摺如潮汐漲落般刷洗掉兩波海潮間在沙灘上所畫的一張臉，並以迫近此刻的生命力來抵禦宿命，開啟生命哲學頓悟的契機。基於此項假設，我們希望能更了解「人可以怎麼存活」的存有倫理議題。
本論文的主體分成三個章節。核心論述的主旨，在討論荒誕夢境如何以荒誕的眩暈效果解放愛麗絲的語言、主體性及時空記憶。第一章〈卡洛爾怪誕語言中的直覺譫慾力〉處理以下研究問題:何以像〈刧搏沃麒龍〉這樣的荒誕詩，會在愛麗絲無法理解的情況下，反倒激發她的靈感?一反荒誕學派將卡洛爾的荒誕詩讀成封閉、自我指涉的語言系統，我們主張他詩中譫慾役使的語言怪獸已回到地表，遊移於意義與荒誕之間的無人疆界，以直覺感知進行對角線式的橫貫運動。在意義的領域中，卡洛爾的荒誕詩過度生產沒有意義的意義，以達到意義的零度，並以詩作為反實現化力場，將已體制化的現狀流變回直覺式的未然。第二章〈「你是誰?」—域外之爪下愛麗絲的主體化過程〉，使用傅柯的域外理論及德勒茲在《傅柯》一書中所闡述的域外之爪，檢驗愛麗絲的主體性。本章旨在闡明，愛麗絲對自我視聽檔案的認知，不斷遭受如身形變化(可視感受圖式)及邏輯衝突(可述自發圖示)等域外之力的闖入而天旋地轉。另一方面，人的生命力所潛藏的狂熱的好奇心，驅使愛麗絲域內之力皺摺其他域外之力，使得主體化區域因不斷遭逢「域外內部化」而得以抗拒生命的僵斃，並建立對自我的倫理關係。第三章〈纏擾的記憶:愛麗絲穿越的荒誕時空〉討論愛麗絲身處的混宇時空所造成的記憶暈眩。瘋狂茶會中時間的凍結及空間的置換，以及紅、白皇后的「兩個國度說」不斷提醒著愛麗絲，這位國家機器派來的城鎮量測官，已進入平滑時空的未然幽微世界。歷史的記憶及空間的經緯敵不過語言及口腹之慾的暴力侵襲，使愛麗絲只能記得，過去的「貧乏」記憶逐漸蛻變為忘卻現在、憶及未來的域外記憶。本章的結論是:愛麗絲越是從記憶中重述奇遇的「歷史」，她就越有可能因生出野性的記憶而丟掉地圖，走進地下與鏡中的「狼群」中。

關鍵字

卡洛爾 ； 德勒茲 ； 愛麗絲小說 ； 生命哲學 ； 荒誕邏輯

並列摘要

This thesis examines the logic of nonsense in Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass. Viewing the logic of nonsense as Carroll’s biophilosophy, the thesis discusses how Carroll generates nonsense in language, subjectivity, and spatiotemporal memory to unsettle Alice in her nonsensical encounters.
Up to this point, a fairly large body of literature in Nonsense School still reads the nonsense in Carroll’s two Alice books as a closed, self-referential language system. This thesis distinguishes itself from its progenitors by examining the unacknowledged relationship between biophilosophy and the logic of nonsense. Given the theoretical position taken for the study and the status of the field as briefly reviewed above, the study aims to provide an answer to the following question: Does the logic of nonsense play a role in Carroll’s construction of biophilosophy? To answer this question, we propose a hypothesis that the giddy effects arise when Alice’s forces of human finitude encounter forces of inhuman infinity in virtual dreams, and the folding of the intrusive outside washes off Alice’s “face drawn in the sand between two tides” (F 89), and initiates a possible moment of epiphany with this now intimate power of life that helps resist life’s destiny. Given this hypothesis, it is hoped that in answering this question we may gain a better understanding of the ontological issue: “How One Might Live.”
This thesis is divided into three major chapters. Our central argument facilitates a discussion of how the nonsensical dreams liberate Alice’s language, subjectivity, and spatiotemporal memory with the giddy effects of nonsense. Chapter One, “Power of Intuitive Délire in Lewis Carroll’s Monstrous Language,” addresses the question: Why does a nonsense poem like “Jabberwocky” fill Alice with ideas when she does not exactly know what they are? While Nonsense School tends to read Carroll’s nonsense poetry as closed, self-referential language system, we argue that his délire-driven linguistic monsters have returned to the surface to intuit the diagonal movements across the borderline between sense and nonsense. In the domain of sense, Carroll’s nonsense poems overproduce sense-deprived sense to reach sense degree zero, and serve as true sites of counter-effectuation that bring actuality (institution) back to virtuality (intuition). Chapter Two, “‘Who are you?’—the Subjectivation of Alice in the Claws of the Outside,” uses Foucault’s theory of outside and Deleuze’s book on Foucault to examine Alice’s subjectivity. This chapter predicates that Alice’s savoir of herself in audio-visual archive is snatched away by such intrusive forces from the outside as size alterations (the visible) and clash of different logics (the articulable). The study presented here illustrates how passionate curiosity in human power of life drives the forces within Alice to fold in other forces from the outside so that the zone of subjectivation constantly undergoes the “interiorization of the outside” (F 98) to resist life’s impasse and establish an ethical relation to oneself. Chapter Three, “A Memory That Haunts: Time and Space in Alice’s Dreams,” discusses Alice’s memory failures in chaosmic time-space. The freezing of time and substituting of space at the mad tea-party, and the issue of “two countries” brought up by Red and White Queens together serve as a constant reminder that the town surveyor Alice sent by the State Apparatus has entered smooth time-space in virtual dreams. The verbal and oral aggressiveness has inflicted violence upon the memory of history and the striation of space to shift Alice’s poor sort of memory that works only backward to memory of the outside that forgets the present and remembers the future. This chapter concludes that the more Alice retells the “history” of her adventures from her memory, the more likely she will throw away her map, and join the “pack of wolves” in two Alices.

並列關鍵字

Carroll ； Deleuze ； Alice books ； biophilosophy ； the logic of nonsense

參考文獻

Magnus, Bernd, and Kathleen Higgins, eds. The Cambridge

Ed. Robert Phillips. New York: Vintage, 1977. 344-73.

1865-1971. Ed. Robert Phillips. New York: Vintage,

Robert Phillips. New York: Vintage, 1977. 198-206.

Strong, T. B. “Lewis Carroll.” Aspects of Alice: Lewis