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  • 學位論文

美國防禦措施「毒藥丸」之研究 ─以敵意併購下目標公司董事之受任人義務為中心

A Study of the Poison Pill Defensive Tactics ─Focusing on the Fiduciary Duties of A Target Company's Board of Directors under the Hostile Takeover

指導教授 : 劉連煜
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摘要


在2008年時,金融大海嘯重挫全球股市,當時併購活動明顯減少,然近期隨著景氣的復甦,全球的併購活動似乎正蠢蠢欲動,捲土重來。根據經濟部自91年到98年的統計,併購件數逾1300件,金額達6,200多億元。而我國近年來隨著兩岸經貿發展頻繁,更可合理預期跨國併購案件數及規模應可進一步成長。惟於2005年至2010年7月間,國內發生開發金併購金鼎證券公司一案,其中最引人爭論的是:當面對敵意併購時,目標公司董事進行的各種防禦手段及其所產生的相關問題。吾人因而認為於諸多企業併購問題中,關於敵意併購之情形應開始重新思索:敵意併購下目標公司董事受任人義務之內涵究竟為何?進一步衍生值得探討的議題有:第一、當公司面對敵意併購時,目標公司應由董事會或股東會決定採取防禦措施(defensive tactics)?第二、目標公司董事所採取的防禦措施有無違反其受任人義務?第三、設置防禦措施是否僅考量目標公司全體股東最大利益,抑或應考量利害關係人之利益方為妥適?基於此,開啟了本文之研究旅程。 首先在第二章,本文乃先從公司治理之角度切入,分析董事與股東間之權限劃分問題,以檢討董事優先主義與股東優先主義之擇採。本文試圖從公司經營與所有分離原則及公司本質理論出發,探討對於出售公司之行為誰握有最終決定權。再者,分析在敵意併購下董事所擔任之角色,以作為下一章有關董事有無採行防禦措施之權限問題為討論基礎。 接著在第三章主要係探討敵意併購與防禦措施間之關連性。先從敵意併購之利弊分析談起,整理學說與司法實務對於董事是否有權採取防禦措施之見解。再介紹本文主要分析之毒藥丸(poison pill)防禦措施,瞭解美國法下之毒藥丸防禦措施之基本運作模式與實施程序。最後,介紹美國反併購法制之發展概況,以瞭解美國政府面對敵意併購時法制政策之考量與所持的態度,以作為我國相關制度建構之參考。 第四章則是分析目標公司董事會決定採行毒藥丸之合法性。為瞭解目標公司董事受任人義務之內涵,本文先從解析美國德拉瓦州司法實務所建立之判決先例原則中,觀察審查標準如何運用在當目標公司董事決定採行防禦措施之情形,亦即司法實務如何判斷董事已經善盡其受任人義務。除此之外,介紹與分析四則2010年至2011年間美國德拉瓦州法院所作的毒藥丸判決,瞭解近期實務發展,並供我國就敵意併購下目標公司董事受任人義務之判斷與權衡作參考。 第五章主要回歸我國企業併購相關法制之檢討,重新檢討我國對於企業併購管制的態度和法院實務對於法規的操作,使目標公司董事面對敵意併購之威脅時應如何面對方符合其受任人義務。所涉問題將從現行企業併購相關法制的問題、我國實施毒藥丸防禦措施之可能性、董事與股東間之利益衝突問題、利害關係人利益之考量、到受任人義務之審查方式等通盤作一檢討。最後於第六章結論處,就目前法制規範所面臨的問題提出建議,以供將來立法和司法實務之參考。

並列摘要


In 2008, the global financial crisis stroked the global stock markets, M & A activity was significantly reduced; however, with the recent economic recovery, global M & A activity appears to be just around the corner, making a comeback. According to the Ministry of Economic Affairs from 91 to 98 years of statistics, the number of mergers and acquisitions over 1300, amounting to 6,200 billion. Besides, the cross-strait economic and trade development in recent years with frequent cross-border mergers and acquisitions can reasonably be expected to scale the number of cases and should be able to grow even further. Nevertheless, from 2005 to July 2010, the domestic development of hostile takeover occurs between China Development Financial holdings and Taiwan International Securities Corporation, one of the most compelling argument is “when faced with hostile takeover, the fiduciary duty of target company directors for setting a variety of defensive tactics and the resulting correlation problems”. Therefore, in many M & A issues, I re-think focusing on the fiduciary duties of a target company's Board of Directors under the Hostile Takeover. First, in the second chapter, this article is to start with the viewpoint of corporate governance, to review directors and shareholders of the division of authority in the corporate. This article attempts to operate from the “Principle of Separating Ownership and Control” and analysis of who owns the rights to sell the company. Then, in the third chapter is focusing on the correlation between hostile takeover and defense tactics. Here, this article starts with the advantages and disadvantages of hostile takeover, consolidation theory and judicial practice for understanding the right of directors to take defensive measures. Besides, I also analyze and introduce the process of Poison Pill defensive tactics. Finally, I describe the development of the Anti-Takeover Statutes of the United States. The fourth chapter is to analyze the target company board of directors decided to adopt the legality of poison pills. To understand the obligations of the authorized directors of the target company content, this practice start parsing the Delaware judicial precedents established principles, observe how the standard of review when the target company directors in the decision to adopt defensive measures in the case, that is, Directors how to determine the authorized representative has been fulfilling its obligations. In addition, the introduction and analysis of four poison pill decision between 2010 to 2011 by the Delaware Court, understand the recent development of practice, and for our country to determine and establish the authorized obligations for the target company. The fifth chapter reviews mergers and acquisitions statutes in Taiwan. How the attitude control laws and regulations and court practice for the operation of the target company directors to face the threat of hostile M & A party should be how to face the obligation to comply with its authorized representative. Implications from the current legal issues related to mergers and acquisitions, our country implementation of the possibility of poison pill defenses, directors and shareholders of the conflict of interest, considering the interests of interested parties, to the obligation of the authorized representative to make a comprehensive review of methods review. Finally, at the sixth chapter is the conclusion to the current problems facing the legal norms to make recommendations for future legislation and judicial practice in Taiwan.

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被引用紀錄


李昀瑾(2011)。股東提名權制度之研究〔碩士論文,國立臺北大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://www.airitilibrary.com/Article/Detail?DocID=U0023-2808201213280300
吳英亮(2012)。營造業公司治理之研究〔博士論文,國立中央大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://www.airitilibrary.com/Article/Detail?DocID=U0031-1903201314455946
洪凱倫(2014)。企業併購中特別委員會之法律問題研究〔碩士論文,國立臺北大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://www.airitilibrary.com/Article/Detail?DocID=U0023-0702201413233100

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