納入延遲策略下之政府環境誘因管制分析

An Analysis of Governmental Environmental Incentive Regulation with Delay

梁雅婷(Ya-Ting Liang)

指導教授 ： 翁仁甫

國立臺北大學/公共事務學院/財政學系/碩士(2010年)

摘要

鑒於過往關於資訊不對稱下的環境管制分析，皆未將環境管制當局可採取延遲（delay）策略，做為管制政策工具的可能性納入討論的範圍。本文擬擴展Boyer and Laffont (1999) 的當事-代理（principal-agent）環境管制分析架構，將政府環境管制當局可以採取延遲策略，做為其環境誘因管制 (environmental incentive regulation) 工具的可能性納入考慮，建構一個考慮延遲策略的環境誘因管制模型，進行政府環境誘因管制措施的福利與經濟影響效果分析，我們除了將探究政府環境管制當局在何種情況下，可以藉由採取延遲策略來達成提升社會福利水準的目的外，亦將針對受管制廠商之國籍別（本國或外國籍）對於政府最適環境管制措施的可能影響提出說明。

關鍵字

環境誘因管制 ； 延遲 ； 誘因理論 ； 當事-代理模型

並列摘要

The past environmental regulation analyses under asymmetric information often disregard the possibility that environmental regulatory authorities may take the delay strategy as regulatory policy tool. This research will construct a model of environmental incentive regulation with delay by expanding the model of Boyer and Laffont (1999). Using our structure, we engage in economy and welfare effect analysis of environmental incentive regulation measures. We explore the condition that the regulation delay can improve social welfare. In addition, we explain the potential influence of the nationality of firm on governmental environmental regulation measures.

並列關鍵字

Environmental Incentive Regulation ； Delay ； Incentive Theory ； Principal-Agent Model

參考文獻

張其祿(2002),“環境管制：經濟誘因工具的選擇與評估”, 《中國行政評論》, 11(3), 45-62。

翁仁甫(2007),“政府當局公共財或提供時點的延遲與社會福利–供給面分析”, 《經濟研究》, 43, 129-148。

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Ando, A. W.(1990), “Waiting to be Protected under the Endangered Species Act: the Political Economy of Regulatory Delay.” Journal of Law and Economics, 42, 29-60.

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