融資併購中少數股東權益保障之研究

A Study on the Protection of Minority Shareholders’ Rights in Leveraged Buyouts

黃齡巧(Lin-Chiao Huang)

指導教授 ： 張心悌

國立臺北大學/法律學院/法律學系/碩士(2011年)

摘要

近年來融資併購於我國盛行，在台灣市場中，國外私募股權基金投資台灣市場，以融資收購手段併購我國公司，從2006年破局的凱雷集團併購日月光案、2007年通過之復盛案、同年私募基金環球視景併購全球窗簾大廠的億豐案、老牌電腦周邊大廠致伸科技也在2007年被美林等私募基金併購下市，即可見一斑。因融資併購大量運用舉債收購之行為，若收購者之成員為目標公司之管理階層，本質上具有利益衝突，因管理階層同時兼併購交易中賣方受託人與買方之角色，不免有降低收購價格以謀私利之疑慮；且管理階層相對於股東而言，對公司享有資訊優勢，更使管理階層容易利用此種優勢剝奪股東利益，因此，對於目標公司股東權益之保障，避免其成為企業併購下之犧牲者，即有深入討論之必要。本文即以「融資併購中少數股東權益保障」為研究對象，先建立融資併購之概念、運作模式，就我國現行法規範對股東所有之保障方式為一論述，進而參考美國立法、實務與學說見解，並對我國融資併購中少數股東權益之保護規範提出檢討與建議。
在程序上之資訊揭露方面，本文建議應強化融資併購後下市交易之資訊揭露義務並建構損害賠償機制。另外，實體上之受託人義務方面，本文建議法院應建立審查標準，並引進美國法上之「完全公平標準」，可令被告董事負主動之舉證責任；而且完全公平標準可促使公司董事或控制股東為了使交易符合司法審查，必需尋求獨立委員會對於併購案與收購者加以協商、提出意見，以符合「公平交易」之標準。如此一來，便能轉換舉證責任至目標公司之少數股東中。而且就是因為有獨立委員會之意見，對於少數股東之收買價格，才能在符合「公平價格」之範圍內。股份收買請求權之方面，本文建議就公平價格之認定應參酌併購後之「綜效利得」，並提出對溢價得否分享之看法。最後，因主管機關就少數股東在公開收購階段應賣股票和合併時被現金逐出，所為之課稅方式不同，是否對於目標公司少數股東形成不當應賣的壓力，希望主管機關能再予以解釋說明。如此，應可達成平衡保護少數股東與鼓勵企業進行併購以增加價值之規範目標。

關鍵字

融資併購 ； 槓桿併購 ； 經營階層收購 ； 企業併購 ； 資訊揭露義務 ； 受託人義務 ； 現金逐出合併 ； 股份收買請求權 ； 下市 ； 經營判斷法則 ； 加強審查標準 ； 完全公平標準 ； 少數股東權益

並列摘要

Leveraged buyouts are popular in Taiwan in recent years. Foreign Private Equity Funds invest in Taiwan markets, making use of a leveraged method to merge or acquire our local companies. Several examples can be found easily. For instance, in addition to the fact that Oaktree Capital Management, LLC succeeded in acquiring FuSheng Industrial Co., Ltd. in 2007, Carlyle Group also showed a high interest in the acquisition of Advanced Semiconductor Engineering, Inc. in 2006, though it ended up with failure. It is usually the case that conducting acquisition requires leveraging, which means that an acquiring company gains greater purchasing power by borrowing a lot of money. Therefore, if the acquirer is the management of Target company, a serious conflict of interest will be involved. Compared to shareholders, the management of a company usually has the advantage of obtaining crucial information, so they are likely to deprive the interests of shareholders. As a result, it seems necessary to have a deep discussion regarding how to protect shareholders’ rights in Target company and prevent them from becoming victims. Taking reference from the U.S legislation, court opinions and scholarship, this thesis introduces the concept of leveraged buyouts first and then analyzes the fair valuation on LBO as well as its regulatory purposes, proposing several ideas for protecting minority shareholders’ rights in LBO in Taiwan.
First, this thesis suggests to strengthen the necessity of the duty of disclosure in going-private transaction and promulgate a damage compensation remedy. In addition, for the fiduciary duty, this paper proposes that we should establish an examining review and import “entire fairness standard” so that the directors have to bear the burden of proof that they don't violate their fiduciary duty. Meanwhile, in order to satisfy the requirements of the entire fairness review, the directors must prove fair price as well as fair dealing simultaneously, which require an arm's length negotiation. If the committee is truly independent, this will shift the “lack of fair price” burden of proof to the minority shareholders contesting the transaction. When the minority shareholders have a committee of board members negotiating on their behalf, they are likely to receive a fair price. Besides, this thesis further suggests that cognizancing fair price should refer to the merger synergy and bring up the thought of sharing the premiums with respect to appraisal rights. Finally, due to the different taxation between tender offer and cash-out merger, if this situation causes minority shareholders to sell securities, the supervising authority should provide a detailed explanation. Given these methods, I hope that we can reach the regulatory goal of protecting minority shareholders and encourage value-increasing acquisitions at the same time.

並列關鍵字

leveraged buyouts ； LBO ； management buyouts ； MBO ； merger and acquisition ； duty of disclosure ； fiduciary duty ； cash-out merger ； appraisal rights ； going-private ； business judgement rule ； enhanced duty ； entire fairness doctrine ； revlon duty ； Dollar Thrifty ； Rule 13e-3

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