中國國有企業 「走出去 」之戰略 ─以委託代理論分析

China's State-Owned Enterprises' “Going Out” Strategy ─ An Analysis of the Principle-Agent Theory

張麗燕(Li-Yen Chang)

指導教授 ： 郝培芝

國立臺北大學/公共事務學院/公共行政暨政策學系/碩士(2014年)

摘要

2001年中國成為世界貿易組織(WTO)會員國之一，根據世界貿易組織的規定，中國必須完全地開放其國內市場的投資，使中國不能再依賴其低廉的技術與廉價的勞工以維持經濟成長。在2000年，中國領導人為了因應加入WTO所帶來的衝擊，提出中國企業「走出去」為國家戰略目標，以擴大其貿易出口，增進中國經濟的成長，且藉由國際合作或國際投資，以提升中國企業的管理與技術水平。
但是，中國企業的「走出去」成員，仍以國有企業為主，但根據2011年中國官方數據的統計，有三分之一的國有企業之海外投資是招致虧損的。目前既有的文獻探討，都從「國家經濟」與「國家安全」來探討中國國有企業走出去之動機，但卻無法進一步解釋中國國有企業現有的弊病與招致虧損的問題。
因此，本文將從中國的內部體制來探討，以「委託─代理」理論為基礎，並結合中國內部體制的特色─行政官僚體系、零碎化的監管關係，以及管理的雙重身分，採用文獻分析法、歷史比較法，探討中國大陸在現行的政經發展體制下，國家機關與國有企業如何各依據其自主性與職能，來進行國有企業跨國購併。並且，利用鐵道部及其相關企業，以及中國石油天然氣集團公司作為分析的個案。在國有企業與國家的「委託─代理」關係中，以上三點的因素將如何影響國有企業「走出去」的戰略形成與產生的結果。

關鍵字

中國國有企業 ； 走出去戰略 ； 委託代理理論

並列摘要

China became one of the World Trade Organization (WTO) members in 2001, in accordance with the provisions of the World Trade Organization, China have to open its domestic market fully, it can’t depend on its low- technology and low-cost labor to sustain its economic growth anymore. So Chinese leaders proposed the “Going Out” strategy that the government-led to overcome the impact when China was admitted to WTO. It is a way to expand its exports and promote the growth of its economy, and Chinese enterprises could improve its management and the levels of technical by international cooperation or international investments.
However, the members of “Going Out” are mostly the China’s state-owned enterprises but one-third of them are not profitable from the transnational operations according to the official data. Most of the traditional analyses of economic factors and security strategies provide an insufficient foundation for understanding the recent surge in overseas expansion of China’s SOEs, and it can’t explain further about the current performance of state-owned enterprises’ fault and the financial losses .
Therefore, the dissertation focuses on the internal institutional structures within China, and based on the principal-agent theory and with the administrative bureaucracies, fragmented bureaucratic principals, as well as managerial dual identities and bureaucratic control in China’s state sector. This study also adopts document analysis and historical analysis, discussing how State agencies and State-owned enterprises taking advantage of its own autonomy and functions to carry out State-owned enterprises transnational mergers under the existing system of political and economic development in China. Moreover, by taking Ministry of railways of the People's Republic of China and the railway-related enterprises as well as China National Petroleum Corporation as two representative cases. Above the three factors how to affect the principal-agent relationship between the China’s SOEs and the Chinese central government, as well as the China’s SOEs agenda setting and the results of “Going Out”.

並列關鍵字

China’s state-owned enterprises ； Going-Out strategy ； Principal-Agent theory

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