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  • 學位論文

鞏固支持或資源拔樁?中央與地方府際關係對於補助款分配之影響

Targeting the Support or the Opposition? The Impacts of Intergovernmental Relations upon the Distribution of Governmental Grants

指導教授 : 吳重禮
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摘要


鑑於府際關係的意涵及其議題具有學理的重要性與實際政治的參考價值,本研究從政黨政治的觀點切入,旨在探討我國中央政府與台灣省21縣市地方政府的「府際關係」(intergovernmental relations)對財政資源分配之影響。詳言之,本研究嘗試比較在中央和地方行政首長為同一政黨所掌握的「垂直式一致政府」(vertical unified government),與中央和地方行政首長分屬不同政黨的「垂直式分立政府」(vertical divided government)之間,其政治運作有何明顯差異?進一步說來,相較「垂直式一致政府」型態,「垂直式分立政府」架構之下的府際關係,是否會因為中央和地方縣市長的政黨屬性不同,造成中央在分配補助款時有所偏袒?據此,本研究以1999年至2009年期間,縣市政府的補助款及協助收入決算審定數做為研究對象,探討府際關係和若干政治變數(總統得票率、得票率差距、總統選舉前一年、縣市長選舉年、執政黨立委比例)的可能影響。在研究設計上,採取結合質性研究與量化研究的「混合研究法」。經由實證分析所得到的初步結論,政黨屬性對於補助款分配或有影響,然此影響卻是有限的,亦即中央不會過度地將資源投入到「垂直式一致政府」之縣市。此外,實證結果顯示相關選舉年與執政黨立委比例等變數,對於補助款分配並無顯著影響。相較於照顧同黨縣市長或同黨立委,中央似乎比較重視的是總統職位的取得,反映在資源分配策略上,補助款明顯傾向流入到上次執政黨總統選舉得票落後以及與對手競爭激烈的縣市,易言之,中央似乎有意藉此拉攏甚或拔樁反對團體與游移團體。當然,政黨政治與府際關係牽涉我國民主發展甚鉅,係值得研究者持續關注的議題。

並列摘要


In view of its theoretical and practical political implications, this study focuses on the intergovernmental relations between central and local governments in Taiwan. Specifically, this study examines the allocation of central grants under two kinds of the intergovernmental relations, which are vertical divided government and vertical unified government. Vertical divided government exists when the central and local governments are controlled by different political parties. On the contrary, vertical unified government implies that both the central and local governments are held by the same political party. By analyzing the grant distribution among 21 counties from 1999 to 2009, this study explores the effects of intergovernmental relations and some political factors (incumbent vote-share, the closeness of vote-share between incumbent and rival, the year before presidential election, the county magisterial/city mayoral election year, and the seat-share of incumbent legislators). In research design, this study employs the mixed research method which combines qualitative and quantitative approaches. Empirical results reveal that vertical divided government may have influences upon the allocation of central grants yet not without restriction. In short, central government would not over-reward the county held by the same party. In addition, neither election year nor the seat-share of incumbent legislators makes statistically significant differences of grant distribution. In contrast, the central government seems to see winning of presidential elections as the top priority. Financial resources tend to flow into those counties in which the incumbent encounters disadvantage or keen competition in previous presidential elections. It implies that the central government to certain extent would like to target the opposition and swinging groups. This study concludes that vertical divided government is an issue worthy of continued research by Taiwan’s political scientists.

參考文獻


邱訪義,2010,〈台灣分立政府與立法僵局-理論建立及其實證意涵〉,《臺灣民主季刊》,7(3):87-121。
蕭怡靖、黃紀,2010,〈單一選區兩票制下的一致與分裂投票-2008年立法委員選舉的探討〉,《臺灣民主季刊》,7(3):1-43。
姚名鴻,2011,〈我國地方財政赤字之理論與實證分析〉,《公共行政學報》,39:37-70。
朱鎮明,2010,〈競爭型計畫與臺灣府際夥伴關係的實踐〉,《公共行政學報》,37:71-110。
吳濟華、馮永猷,2008,〈中位投票者模型與地方公共支出:台灣之實證研究〉,《公共行政學報》,29:29-60。

被引用紀錄


鄒幸純(2013)。採用生育補助之影響因素─以臺灣319個鄉鎮市為例〔碩士論文,淡江大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6846%2fTKU.2013.01009
莊朝欽(2011)。捕蠅紙效果與政治因素之實證研究-以臺灣地方財政為例〔碩士論文,國立臺北大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://www.airitilibrary.com/Article/Detail?DocID=U0023-2408201117100100

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