不完全競爭市場的三個議題:垂直整合,水平合併與內生成長

Three Issues Concerning Imperfect Competition：Vertical Integration, Horizontal Mergers and Endogenous Growth

張淑華(Shu-Hua Chang)

指導教授 ： 賴景昌 ； 陳忠榮

國立中央大學/管理學院/產業經濟研究所/博士(2006年)

摘要

摘要

論文題目：不完全競爭市場的三個議題：垂直整合、水平合併與內生成長
校所組別：國立中央大學產業經濟研究所
研究生：張淑華
指導教授：賴景昌博士 陳忠榮博士
論文提要及內容：

不完全競爭市場在現實社會中是普遍存在的現象，不完全競爭市場包含要素市場不完全競爭與商品市場不完全競爭，隨著工會組織力量日漸強大以及工會參與率提高的趨勢(尤其是歐洲國家)，勞動市場工會化將影響廠商對勞動的需求及產品最適產量，進而影響總體經濟績效。在產業經濟方面，大多數文獻討論的議題都是以產品市場不完全競爭而勞動市場為完全競爭的假設為前提，而忽略工會談判於工資成本與勞動雇用量所扮演的重要角色。另一方面，傳統的總體經濟模型皆假設商品市場為完全競爭，自Dixon (1987) 提出不完全競爭市場的總體經濟模型，使得不完全競爭市場在總體經濟發展上逐漸嶄露頭角，而成為眾所矚目的焦點。
準此，本論文的目的是分別探討勞動市場不完全競爭對廠商決策的影響，以及商品市場不完全競爭對經濟成長的效果。對於勞動市場的不完全競爭，本文採用參與管理權的工會談判模型 (right to manage model)，此種議價方式係由工會與廠商議定工資，而勞動量由廠商決定。因此，工會與廠商的議價能力則決定廠商的工資成本，進而影響廠商的決策與福利水準。在第二章，我們建立一個雙佔的垂直產業結構與廠商價格競爭模型，考慮勞動市場工會化的效果。若製造商可採取兩段訂價法，以收取權利金的方式完全剝奪零售商盈餘時，廠商的最佳策略，應選擇垂直整合或是垂直分割，則決定於工會與廠商議價能力的相對大小。當工會的議價能力相對較大，廠商應選擇垂直整合較為有利。在第三章中，我們建立一個雙佔垂直的產業結構與廠商數量競爭模型，同時考慮了勞動市場工會化的效果，不論是發生上游廠商合併或是下游廠商合併，工會的談議價能力決定了對福利水準損害的程度。
在第四章，我們假設中間財為不完全競爭的市場，而最終財為完全競爭市場，由於政府對於基礎建設的支出，例如道路、橋樑的興建皆有利於私部門的生產，因此將政府支出視為生產要素，分別討論政府支出為流量與存量變數兩種情況，考慮了勞動內生化，並建立一個內生成長模型，據以分析不完全競爭程度與所得稅政策對經濟成長率的影響。我們發現當政府支出為流量變數時，若勞動與私人資本為互補要素，獨占力愈大，將阻礙經濟成長。若勞動與私人資本為替代要素，獨占力愈大，可能有助於經濟成長。此外，所得稅率提高將使經濟成長率降低。我們也發現當政府支出為存量變數時，獨占力愈大，將阻礙經濟成長。此外，所得稅率提高對經濟成長率的影響則不確定。

關鍵字

水平合併 ； 內生成長 ； 垂直整合

並列摘要

Abstract

Imperfect competition is a prevalent and realistic phenomenon in modern market structures that exists in both labor markets and product markets. Most of the industrial economics literature analyzes the behavior of firms in imperfectly competitive product markets, while perfect competition exists in the labor markets. However, labor markets in most economies are far from being perfectly competitive. There is growing trend of union participation rates are much higher, especially in continental Europe. Consequently, trade unions play an important role for the determination of wages and employment. On the other hand, most standard macroeconomic models, however, assume that markets are perfectly competitive. In practice, imperfect competition in product markets can have a significant impact on the level of employment and the effectiveness of macroeconomic policy.
In Chapter 2, we examine the consequences of unionization for the rivalry between duopoly firms in two types of contracts: vertical integration and vertical separation. If a franchise fee is used to extract the retailer’s profit, then it is in the individual interest of each manufacturer to choose vertical separation and charge his retailer a wholesale price in excess of the unit production cost, depending on the specific time structures. These arguments could make integration preferable for the manufacturer if the wage bargaining power of the union is relatively powerful.
In Chapter 3, we set up a framework for in a duopolistic industry characterized by unobserved vertical contracts, and where there are two vertical chains with two upstream manufacturers selling to two downstream retailers, we show that the wage is jointly determined by the union and the firm through bargaining and that the wage bargaining power of the union under different regimes, regardless of whether an upstream merger or a downstream merger takes place, will determine the degree of the welfare damage effect. It is also found that an upstream or a downstream monopolist, regardless of whether it possesses the right to franchise, will exert no impact on the equilibrium outputs and total profit, and will only affect the distribution of profits within the vertical chain.
In Chapter 4, we set up an endogenous growth model in which public capital is a productive input and monopolistic competition characterizes the intermediate goods sector. Based on such a framework, the objectives of this study can be roughly divided into two parts: (1) public capital is regarded as a flow: we find that an increase in the degree of imperfect competition will have different effects on the growth rate according to whether labor and private capital are substitutive or complementary inputs; (2) public capital is regarded as a stock: we show that an increase in the degree of imperfect competition leads to a reduction in capital accumulation and a lower growth rate. In addition, we examine how income taxation may either discourage or encourage the growth rate. We also explore the transitional adjustment in the economic growth rate in response to a pre-announced tax policy and regulation concerning the monopoly power.

並列關鍵字

Endogenous Growth ； Vertical Integration ； Horizontal Mergers

參考文獻

Benhabib, J. and R.E.A. Farmer (1994), “Indeterminacy and Increasing Returns,” Journal of Economic Theory 63, 19-41.

Benhabib, J. and K. Nishimura (1998), “Indeterminacy and Sunspots with Constant Returns,” Journal of Economic Theory 81, 58-96.

Chang, S.H. (2005), “Upstream Mergers, Downstream Mergers, and Unionized Oligopoly,” The American Economist, Vol. 49, 67-74.

Coto-Martínez, J. (2005), “Public Capital and Imperfect Competition,” Journal of Public Economics, forthcoming.

Dixon, H. (1987), “A simple model of imperfect competition with Walrasian features,” Oxford Economic Papers 39, 134-160.