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  • 學位論文

從朱子工夫論詮釋其理氣心性論

An Interpretation of Zhu-xi's Li-Qi and Xin-Xing with His Theory of Moral cultivation

指導教授 : 李瑞全
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摘要


本論文是關於朱子道德實踐哲學的研究。朱子道德哲學的最終目的是成為聖人,此與傳統儒家之目標相呼應。在朱子思想中,在未成為聖人之前,人人都必須通過修養工夫,方能圓滿實現道德的實踐;在成為聖人之後,仍需透過工夫來維持。本論文採取不同過去的詮釋進路,從工夫論觀點詮釋朱子理氣心性論,以把握朱子道德哲學的實踐性意義。 朱子工夫論有兩個前提:第一是心與氣成為實現道德的現實經驗之實現主體,即實踐主體;第二是其實現主體的心與氣受到限制性理之實現的氣質人欲影響。由此前提,朱子強調,人通過修養工夫,克服人欲而變化氣質,以實現天理,而成道德人格自我,即聖人。其工夫方法乃為窮理與居敬:窮理是以明理與真知為主的格物致知;居敬是貫通未發涵養與已發省察的心之本領工夫。藉由窮理與居敬工夫,可以使心之知覺提撕以實踐道德命令,而完成道德行動。 如果從工夫論觀點詮釋心性論與理氣論,我必須強調將會得到這樣的詮釋結果:心與氣本具性或理,是能實現其性或理的實現主體,即道德實踐主體,此是一種道德的執行者;性或理是創生道德的道德之理,必須依氣而實現,此為一種道德的立法者,同時為道德實踐的根據。人通過修養工夫而變化氣質,心與性、氣與理能夠關聯地合一而成道德生命,成為所謂「道德主體」。如此的朱子道德實踐哲學成為「關聯合一的自律道德」形態。

關鍵字

工夫論 窮理 居敬 天理人欲 道德主體

並列摘要


The main focus of this thesis is to study Zhu-xi’s moral philosophy. According to traditional Confucianism, the aim of Zhu-xi’s moral philosophy is to become a sage. In Zhu-xi’s theory, everyone, before being a sage, must keep doing the practice of cultivating himself or herself. Even if the agent has become a sage, he or she still has to keep practicing to maintain or ensure the rightness of his/her act. The approach of this thesis is to regard Zhu-xi’s moral cultivation theory as the ground to interpret his Li-Qi theory(理氣論) and Xin-Xing theory(心性論). I believe this different approach is helpful for us to understand the practical meaning of Zhu-xi’s moral philosophy. There are two premises of Zhu-xi’s moral cultivation theory. First, Xin and Qi can affect the actualization of moral commands are both practical subjects. Second, the Xin and Qi practical subjects, Xin and Qi, are easily influenced and limited by human desire, and under the influence and limitation, the practical subjects won’t act in accordance with the moral commands. Due to these two premises, Zhu-xi emphasized that for agents, only through moral practice to cultivate themselves, they can overcome the seducement of human desire, and after the accomplishment of moral practice including cultivation they could purify moral mind and finally become a sage. Zhu-xi’s theory of moral cultivation is constructed of two parts, which are “investigation of reason to the utmost”(Qiong-li, 窮理)and “respectfulness”(Ju-jing, 居敬). The function of Qiong-li(窮理), also called “Ko-wu chih-chih(格物致知, attaining knowledge through investigation of things and matters)”, and its goal(not the final end) is to understand the moral laws and transform the understanding into true knowledge(Chen-chih, 真知). The function of Ju-jing(居敬) is to cultivate the practical subject, Xin, and transform our human desire before we act so that we will act morally and actualize our moral personality as a sage. Zhu-xi claimed that agents can purified their mind to follow the moral commands through Qiong-li(窮理) and Ju-jing(居敬). According to my moral cultivation interpretative approach, regarding moral cultivation as the primordial element to re-interpret Zhu-xi’s Xin-Xing theory and Li-Qi theory, I must emphasis that the result and the argument are, first, “Xin houses Li(心本具理)” and “Qi houses Li(氣本具理)”. Hence, we have reason to say that Xin together with Qi is a moral agent which could have sufficient capacity to carry out the moral commands. Second, Xing and Li have moral creativity, thus, they are the basis of moral practice. Agent can transform his heat/mind or consciousness from normality to morality through moral cultivation, and through the cultivation, Xin and Xing(as well as Li and Qi) can be rendered identical in the sense of practical unity of agent and principle in relatedness within one body. Third, If the last two points could be justified, Xin and Qi will constitute us as a “moral subject”, and the agent will become a “moral agent”. Therefore, the Zhu-xi’s moral philosophy could be classified as a kind autonomous theory in the sense of unity of Xin and Xing in practical relatedness, or for short, “related identical autonomy”.

參考文獻


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