兩岸建構軍事互信機制之研究

Military Confidence-Building Measures across the Taiwan Strait

鄧俊育(Deng Jun-Yu)

指導教授 ： 林泰和

國立中正大學/社會科學院/戰略暨國際事務研究所/碩士(2011年)

摘要

1996年台海危機後至今，兩岸關係歷經人員、文化、社會、經濟等面向頻繁的交流與互動，整體上已可謂趨於和緩穩定。惟兩岸爆發軍事衝突的可能性依然尚存，特別是中國對台政策尚未放棄武力犯台的可能。有鑑於此，提出一個讓兩岸互動更為正常化與遠離軍事緊張的政策—建立兩岸MCBM—以逐步及階段性的降低中國與台灣爆發戰爭的可能性，營造穩定亞太安全環境，實為台灣國家安全戰略重要的一環。
本文參酌西方既有關於CBMs之經驗，針對海峽兩岸特殊的「國與國」互動模式，循體系層次的分析途徑，探討兩岸形成軍事安全對話和建立軍事上信心措施機制的可行性。文中指出，建立此一機制的變項不純粹在於兩岸雙方的國內政治因素。詳言之，國際體系中的權力分配與強權國家的立場和實際作為此等來自體系層次的獨立變項，也會左右未來兩岸MCBM是否得以順利形成。透過台灣、中國及美國三方立場分析，輔以國際關係理論中的結構現實主義進行理解。本研究指出，兩岸MCBM形成的可能性「不高」；其原因在於，除非馬政府之後的台灣明確且堅定地走向獨立建國，否則中國在理性選擇之下，沒有選擇發動對台軍事攻擊的理由。在整體國力相較於台灣擁有相對優勢的前提下，中國根本沒有建立MCBM的必要，頂多將其視為一種政策議題，用以安撫台灣和減少美國干涉兩岸事務過深。惟「台灣不獨」和「中國不武」等兩項國內層次的因素並無法全面性解釋兩岸建立MCBM的低可能性，蓋美中兩強在國際體系中的權力消長與彼此互動，會左右不獨或不武的程度。毋寧，在美國執意進行對台軍售時，台灣的主權獨立性被提升，中國必然也隨之強化武力統一的能量。此時和緩穩定氛圍遭破壞，MCBM的建構可能自然「不高」。倘若，美中兩國關係和緩，美政府又遵行「一中原則」與「三公報」時，台灣的主權獨立性會下降，中國武犯台灣的強度也會隨之消減。

關鍵字

軍事互信機制

並列摘要

Since the third Taiwan Strait Crisis was finished in 1996, the relationship between PRC and ROC (Taiwan) becomes more stable due to frequent interactions of people, cultures, societies, and economies. The possibility of military conflict between PRC and Taiwan still exists. Especially PRC does not give up infringing Taiwan via military. Thus, Establish a strategy which could not only reduce the possibility of war for both country but also build a stable environment in Asian-Pacific Area, Military Confidence Building Measures (MCBMs) between PRC and Taiwan, is important for the link of Taiwan national security strategy.
Refer to the CBMs experiences and specific “country to country” interactions in Cross-Strait relations. This research analyses the feasibility of making the military security dialogue and establishing MCBMs in Cross-Strait relations. In this research, the factors of establishing MCBMs are not from the national political issue in both country but from the international power distribution and the position of power countries. This research indicates the little possibility of MCBMs in Cross-Strait relations via the analysis from the positions of Taiwan, PRC and USA and Structural Realism of Theories of International Relations. In analysis, PRC will not have reason to use military attack to Taiwan unless President Ma insist the position that Taiwan is independent. Compared with Taiwan, PRC does not have to make MCBMs due to the superior national power. MCBMs might only be a strategy issue for reducing the interference from USA and pacifying Taiwan. Use No independent and No use of force in Cross-Strait relations cannot totally explain the low possibility of MCBM between both countries. The growth and decline of power during PRC and USA in international status will affect the level of No Unification or No Independent. If USA insists to sell the military hardware to Taiwan, the independent character of Taiwan will grow. PRC must strengthen the level of the use of force for Unification. The possibility of MCBMs will not be high due to the unstable Cross-Strait relations. In other word, if USA and PRC have a stable relationship and USA also follows One-China policy and Three Communiqués, the independent character of Taiwan will decline and so does level of the use of force for Unification from PRC.

並列關鍵字

MCBMs

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