機構投資人投資期限與資本支出關聯性之研究

Institutional Investors’ Investment Horizon and Corporate Investment

白舒媛(Shu-Yuan Pai)

指導教授 ： 鄭揚耀

國立中正大學/管理學院/財務金融學系/碩士(2014年)

摘要

本文探討機構投資人投資期限與公司資本支出的關係，從機構投資人致力於監督公司的角度，檢視機構投資人長期持股對公司資本支出及股票報酬的影響。實證結果得知，遇過度投資之公司，若機構投資人增長持股期間，公司下一期的資本支出將降低；反之，投資不足的公司，若機構投資人增長持股期間，將使公司下一期的資本支出增加，皆代表資本支出情況轉趨良好。且因機構投資人長期持股，公司較能判斷其合適的資本支出，遇投資問題的公司改變其投資策略，將使下一期公司股票報酬提高。總結而言，透過機構投資人長期持股可增進其對公司之監理動機，使經理人對公司的資本支出判斷較為正確，有效減緩公司之代理問題。

關鍵字

經理人監督 ； 投資不足 ； 過度投資 ； 投資期限 ； 機構投資人

並列摘要

This paper investigates how institutional investors influence on firms’ investment policies and stock performance. Using institutional turnover level to capture investor’s trading horizons, we find that an increase in the holding period of institutional investors is associated with a subsequent decrease (increase) in real investment of firm’s that over- (under-) investment. Both of the situations represent that the firms’ capital expenditure becomes better. More importantly, firms with long-term institutional investors are associated with higher stock performance. Overall, the evidence indicates that long-term institutional investors can influence managers’ capital expenditure decisions and lower agency problems effectively.

並列關鍵字

under-investment ； over-investment ； investors’ investment horizons ； institutional investors ； management monitoring

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