管理控制力、負債比率對企業績效的影響

The Impact of Managerial Power and Debt on Firm Performance

林綉綾(XIU-LING LIN)

指導教授 ： 楊麗文

朝陽科技大學/管理學院/會計系/碩士(2017年)

摘要

企業聘請管理者，將所有權與經營權分離，以提高企業經營績效，達到股東利益最大化。但由於管理者與股東之間可能會產生代理問題，為了解決此類問題，公司可以透過公司治理等機制，例如成立董事會等，藉由公司治理減少管理者做出對公司不利的決策(Berle and Means 1932; Fama and Jensen 1983)。但也有學者認為公司管理階層會透過對企業決策的影響力與控制力，進而影響企業績效。
本研究利用最小平方法探討台灣上市、上櫃和興櫃公司在不同管理控制力下是否對企業績效產生影響，不同管理控制力與負債比率的情況下，對企業績效是否產生交互作用影響，進行實證分析。
實證結果顯示，董事長持股比率越大，管理控制力越高，股東報酬率越高。董事長與總經理非為同一人時，管理控制力越低，股東報酬率越高。不同的管理控制力代理變數，對企業經營績效的影響結果並不一致。董事長持股比率與負債水準對企業經營績效產生交互作用影響，但董事長與總經理是否為同一人與負債水準不對企業經營績效產生交互作用影響。不同的負債水準與管理控制力之間對企業經營績效產生之交互作用影響並不一致。

關鍵字

代理理論 ； 公司治理 ； 管理控制力 ； 負債比率 ； 企業績效

並列摘要

The corporate deliberately separates its ownership from management by engaging a professional manager to promote business achievements and maximize the benefits of its shareholders. However, there consequently exists the agency problem between the manager and shareholders. To restrain the derived matters, corporate governance devices may be implemented, such as organizing the board of directors, to diminish the unfavorable decision to the company made by the manager (Berle and Means 1932; Fama and Jensen 1983). Some scholars, on the other hand, hold the opinion that the manager will eventually influence firm performance through his/her efforts and power to the corporate decision-making. Whether the managerial power exerts an influence on firm performance remains a question for consideration.

This study probed into the following issues, by applying Least Squares Method to conduct empirical analysis, whether, in a public company, distinct managerial powers act on firm performance and whether distinct managerial powers and debt ratios have an interactive function with firm performance.

The empirical result indicated that the more shareholding ratio the chairman has, the stronger managerial power he/she accordingly possesses, the higher rate of return the shareholders will earn. Whereas the chairman does not simultaneously portray the role of general manager, his/her managerial power will, as a result, get lower, but the shareholders still gain higher rate of return. Diverse agency variables of the managerial power reveals inconsistent significance concerning its influence on firm performance. The chairman’s shareholding ratio and debt level have close connection with business achievements; yet, whether the chairman and the general manager are the same person and how his/her debt level is make no momentous interaction with management performance. The empirical result also showed discordant outcome regarding the situation whether distinct debt levels and managerial powers bring up an interaction with the firm’s management performance.

並列關鍵字

Agency Theory ； Corporate Governance ； Managerial Power ； Debt Ratio ； Firm Performance

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