信評機構的獨立性不足,發行人付費乃為主要原因。若能正本清源,徹底根除利益衝突問題,其他的規範難題均能迎刃而解。因此,本文建議,由財團法人證券投資人及期貨交易人保護中心作為支付評等機構報酬之仲介者,使得信用評等機構成為「買方」的信評機構,發行人不再支付報酬予信用評等機構。至於規範我國信評機構法制的手段或方法,應採取揭露基準模式,始能貫徹信評法制之立法目的─投資人不過份信賴評等,而應自行為理性評估及判斷投資風險後,作成充分資訊的投資決定。雙管齊下,定能收立竿見影之效。
Inaccurate credit ratings are caused in large part by the ”issuer pays” system, in which the credit ratings agencies (CRAs) are paid by the parties, whose products are being evaluated, thus creating an obvious conflict of interest. In order to resolve this problem in Taiwan, this paper argues that the Securities and Futures Investors Protection Center should become an intermediary between the issuer and CRAs, whereby issuers of securities pay the Securities and Futures Investors Protection Center for choosing CRAs. Although many scholars have suggested the CRAs should be subject to liability for bad ratings, yet this paper still proposes disclosure-based regulation to increase CRAs disclosure because liability systems are overly complicated and ineffective in deterring bad ratings.