從內控制度及風險管理之國際規範趨勢論我國的公司治理法制：兼論董事監督義務之法律移植

On Taiwan's Corporate Governance Rules from a Perspective of the International Regulatory Trend of Internal Controls and Risk Management (with Notes on the Legal Transplant of Directors' Duty to Monitor)

蔡昌憲(Chang-Hsien Tsai)

《臺大法學論叢》 41卷4期 (2012/12) Pp. 1819-1896

https://doi.org/10.6199/NTULJ.2012.41.04.04

摘要

亞洲公司治理協會（Asian Corporate Governance Association, ACGA）於2011年2月發表「ACGA臺灣公司治理白皮書」而指出，董事會有效性（board effectiveness）乃我國目前待加強的公司治理關鍵議題之一。實際上，我國雖有內控制度、法令遵循、甚至含括風險管理的相關法令，惟似因董事監督功能不彰，頻生內控失靈而致公司損害的事件。我國立法者近年來雖針對公司治理的相關法制，就董事會之成員組成及組織性改革頗多著墨；惟除強化董事會獨立性及設置功能性委員會外，或許如何同步透過董事監督義務以強化企業內控制度及法令遵循的落實，亦屬目前刻不容緩的重要課題。換言之，我國似不應僅關注透過董事會之成員組成及組織性改革等手段來加強董事會功能；亦應注意到，欲使董事會監督功能獲得有效發揮的核心因素，乃如何使董事會在作決策時能充分獲得資訊之過程；亦即吾人應同時考量如何透過受託義務（fiduciary duties）下之董事監督義務及違反時之法律責任，以有效改善董事進行風險監督過程之決策時誘因。總之，藉由同步協調強化組織性、成員組成以及監督之決策過程等董事會改革的三要素，作為全面地強化我國董事會監督功能的藍圖，或始能深化董事會改革而增進董事會的實質有效性，進而提升我國的公司治理。

關鍵字

獨立董事 ； 董事監督義務 ； 內部控制制度 ； 風險管理 ； 法令遵循 ； 董事會決策過程改革 ； 董事會組織性改革 ； 董事會成員組成改革 ； 公司治理法制 ； 法律移植

並列摘要

The Taiwan Corporate Governance White Paper published by Asian Corporate Governance Association (”ACGA”) in February, 2011 indicated that one of the crucial issues in terms of corporate governance that Taiwan would need to address currently is board effectiveness. Although Taiwan has written laws governing internal controls, compliance with law and even risk management, various corporate scandals due to internal control failure broke out, which might be attributed to board ineffectiveness in oversight. In addition to the efforts of Taiwan's legislature focused primarily on changing board composition (e.g., advancing board independence) and structure (e.g., establishing board committees such as the compensation committee), improving the enforcement of laws governing internal controls and compliance with law through strengthening director liability for breaching the duty to monitor should also be an imminent issue. In other words, in contrast to policymaking efforts focused merely on changing composition and structure, what should meanwhile be done could be to identify decision-making and, more importantly, the processes that inform the board's decisions as the core of the board's monitoring function. Put differently, we should seriously consider how to effectively advance board members' incentives to monitor management during the decision-making process, through moderately tightening legal liability for breaching fiduciary duties of oversight. In sum, carrying out board reforms of composition, structure and process of oversight altogether might be a better way to fortify the board's monitoring function in Taiwan. With board efficacy built up, Taiwan's corporate governance can thus be bettered.

並列關鍵字

independent director ； directors' duty to monitor (duty of oversight) ； internal control systems ； risk management ； compliance with law ； board reform of decision-making process ； board structural reform ； board compositional reform ； corporate governance rules ； legal transplant

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