交易成本、權力不均與政治過程－對台灣工業區污染抗爭的分析

本文意圖將政治力及地方派系的影響納入土地使用衝突的分析當中，從交易成本經濟學及制度的角度，解明為何台灣工業區的污染抗爭會發展出政府官員介入協商扮演行政裁量角色的原因。台灣工業區的污染抗爭是不同的個人或團體從衝突的協商談判中，進行權力結構重組與財產權重分配的過程。它是一個政治過程，藉以扭轉對權力不均的不滿。因此當都市計畫的靜態手段（設置綠帶、調整土地使用型態）面對動態的政治過程，其角色居於被動地位的無奈也就不難理解了。從本文的觀點，台灣的工業區污染糾紛的權力結構主要受資訊、時間、組織與選擇代理人等四個因素的影響。在糾紛處理的制度選擇上，環境協議書因為符合多次交易的背景及政策關係人之間信任的培養，本文建議其為一種理想的糾紛處理制度。但是必須要有相關的配套環境，在政治過程中建立合法性，並降低制度變遷的交易成本，才有進一步在臺灣實踐的可能。

關鍵字

環境糾紛；交易成本；權力；制度變遷；工業區

並列摘要

This paper regards local faction as a key factor to explain the land use conflict caused by pollution in Taiwan's industrial disputes. This factor is incorporated in the theoretical analysis related to the political process and power imbalance. Based on the viewpoint of transaction cost economics, it is shown that the power relationships of Taiwan's industrial disputes are mainly affected by information, time, organizations and agent choice factors. Thus, the author suggests the environmental agreement between firms and local community could be an institution for conflict resolution, since multiple transactions and trust between stakeholders are necessary conditions.

並列關鍵字

Environmental dispute ； Transaction costs ； Power ； Institutional change ； Industrial park

參考文獻

Alexander, E R.(1992).A Transaction Cost Theory of Planning.Journal of the American Planning Association.58(2),190-200.

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