本研究以2008年至2015年之上市(櫃)公司為樣本,採用三種避稅衡量方式(總財稅差異、永久性財稅差異及現金有效稅率),探討公司購買董監事暨重要職員責任保險(directors and officers liability insurance,文後簡稱D&O保險)是否影響公司管理階層避稅決策。實證結果發現購買D&O保險之公司,管理階層避稅程度較小,愈不會從事避稅行為。換言之,購買D&O保險將強化公司治理機制,因而較能抑制管理階層從事避税行為。此外,本文進一步針對有購買D&O保險的公司,探討D&O投保金額對避稅行為的影響,研究發現實際投保金額愈大之公司,管理階層避稅程度愈小,愈不可能進行避稅行為。然而值得注意的是,當公司有超額投保情況時,超額投保金額愈大,則管理階層可能因道德危機導致避稅程度愈大。
Using publicly available D&O insurance data of the listed firms in Taiwan from 2008 to 2015, and based on three measures to capture tax avoidance activities (total book-tax difference, permanent book-tax difference and cash effective tax rate), this paper examines the relationship between directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance hereafter) and firms' tax avoidance activities. Our empirical results consistently indicate that D&O insurance is negatively associated with tax avoidance activities. In other words, D&O insurance will enhance the effectiveness of corporate governance, and prevent the management from engaging in tax avoidance activities. Moreover, we also find that D&O insurance coverage is negatively associated with firms' tax avoidance activities. However, our further tests find a positive relationship between abnormal D&O insurance coverage and tax avoidance activities, indicating that the abnormal D&O insurance coverage will induce moral hazard and lead to more aggressive tax avoidance activities.
為了持續優化網站功能與使用者體驗,本網站將Cookies分析技術用於網站營運、分析和個人化服務之目的。
若您繼續瀏覽本網站,即表示您同意本網站使用Cookies。