薪酬委員會之專業性與高階經理人薪酬相對績效評估

Compensation Committee Expertise and Relative Performance Evaluation of Executive Compensation

潘虹華(Hung-Hua Pan) ； 廖懿屏(Yi-Ping Liao) ； 鍾旻純(Min-Chun Chung)

《會計評論》 68期 (2019/01) Pp. 119-159

https://doi.org/10.6552/JOAR.201901_(68).0004

摘要

本研究探討薪酬委員會專業性對高階經理人薪酬相對績效評估的影響。《股票上市或於證券商營業處所買賣公司薪資報酬委員會設置及行使職權辦法》明訂薪酬委員需依相對績效評估給予高階經理人薪酬，且薪酬委員需具備學術人士、專門職業人士以及公司業務相關實務人士三者之一的資格，而本研究發現這三種資格中，僅當薪酬委員會多數由學術人士組成時，會採用以市場績效指標為基礎的相對績效評估來給予高階經理人薪酬；而當薪酬委員會多數由專門職業人士或實務人士組成時，則無此發現。此外，當薪酬委員會多數由具有財務或會計專長者組成時，亦會採用以市場績效指標為基礎的相對績效評估。綜上所述，現行法規中僅學術資格對採用相對績效評估有所影響，故主管機關應考量其他二類資格之適切性，而若未來主管機關欲對法規進行修訂，應可考量對薪酬委員會委員要求具備財務或會計專長，以使薪酬委員有效發揮職能。

關鍵字

薪酬委員會 ； 高階經理人薪酬 ； 相對績效評估

並列摘要

This study examines whether the use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in executive compensation depends on the expertise of compensation committee members. First, based on the guidance, ＂Regulations Governing the Appointment and Exercise of Powers by the Remuneration Committee of a Company Whose Stock is Listed on the Stock Exchange or Traded Over the Counter＂, stipulated by Financial Supervisory Commission, the member of a compensation committee should meet any of the following expertise: academic background, professional certificates, or business experiences. Our empirical results show that when the majority members of the compensation committee are with academic background, the compensation committee will use stock market performance based RPE in the executive compensation. Besides, when the majority of the compensation committee members are with financial or accounting expertise, the compensation committee will apply the stock market performance based RPE in the executive compensation. Collectively, in order to meet the policy objective, the regulator should reconsider the effectiveness of the current guidance, and require in the future the compensation committee members to possess the financial or accounting expertise.

並列關鍵字

Compensation committee ； Executive compensation ； Relative performance evaluation

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