Corporate Performance and the Dual Roles of Boards: Firm Characteristics, Governance Regulations, and CEO-Director Relationships

公司績效與董事會雙重角色：公司特性、政策法規及CEO與董事的社會網絡連結

王陽照(Yang-Chao Wang) ； 林修葳(Hsiou-Wei W. Lin) ； 李存修(Tsun-Siou Lee) ； 蔡瑞容(Jui-Jung Tsai)

《會計評論》 68期 (2019/01) Pp. 81-117

https://doi.org/10.6552/JOAR.201901_(68).0003

摘要

This study examines how firm characteristics, governance regulations, and CEO-director social ties affect the dual roles of directors as advisors and monitors and, in turn, influence corporate governance. We find that the effectiveness of outside directors as advisors is particularly significant in firms with more external uncertainty and dependence, whereas inside directors' advising effectiveness increases when firms rely more heavily on firm-specific expertise or on short-lived innovation profits. The effectiveness of outside directors as monitors diminishes in firms with high monitoring costs such as firms with less persistent earnings. Firm performance after the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and related exchange rules further supports our findings. We document that the regulations, which mandate uniformly high levels of outside director monitoring on all firms, are detrimental to firms that have a greater need for inside directors to pursue competitive advantage. Such regulations also neglect social links between CEO and directors, which may influence directors' responsibility in monitoring firms.

關鍵字

Board composition ； Firm performance ； Sarbanes-Oxley Act ； Social ties

並列摘要

本研究探討公司特性、政策法規，以及CEO與董事間的網絡連結強度如何影響董事建議和監督的雙重角色，從而影響公司的治理。研究結果發現具有較高外部不確定性和依賴性的公司，其外部董事建議的有效性較為顯著。而當公司較依賴產業、公司特有的專精知識技術，或者較依賴短期高獲利的創新時，則會增加內部董事建議的有效性。再者，當公司有較高的監督成本（例如：營收不穩定）時，則會降低外部董事監督的有效性。檢查沙賓法案（Sarbanes-Oxley Act）與相關證交所掛牌準則的施行對於企業經營績效所帶來的影響，其結果更加支持我們的論點。研究結果顯示全面性地強制要求過半的獨立董事，此種法規對於需要有較高比率的內部董事以追求競爭優勢的公司而言，有負面的效果。而這些相關的法律條文，亦忽略了CEO與董事之社會網絡連結，會改變董事對公司管理階層監督職責的履行。

並列關鍵字

董事會組成 ； 公司績效 ； 沙賓法案 ； 社會網絡連結

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