不作為因果判斷中的假設性思考問題

本文運用對比因果論，處理不作為因果判斷中假設性思考的三個問題：不作為如何成為原因項、原因過度滋生、因果篩選。本文主張：一、不作為宣稱是一種對比判斷；二、不作為因果判斷中的假設性思考受到規範限制，它是正常化情境的反事實思考；三、因果篩選涉及規範適用。最後，本文指出，不作為因果判斷的因果篩選，其目的是為了找出適當的干預對象，並提出一種基於成本考量的判準來補充訴諸規範的因果篩選。

關鍵字

不作為的因果關係；對比因果論；反事實思考；因果篩選；規範

並列摘要

This article deploys the contrastive theory of causation to deal with three problems of the hypothetical thinking in omissive casual judgements: omission as causal relata, the proliferation of causes, and causal selection. It argues: first, claims about omissions are contrastive judgements; second, the hypothetical thinking in omissive causal judgements is constrained by norms and is counterfactual reasoning in a normalized situation; third, causal selection involves the application of norms. Finally, the point of causal selection in omissive causal judgments is to pick out appropriate targets for interventions, and this article proposes a criterion based on the cheapest cost preventer to supplement the norm-based criteria for causal selection.

並列關鍵字

Causation by omission ； contrastive theory of causation ； counterfactual thinking ； causal selection ； norms

參考文獻

Bernstein, S. (2015). The metaphysics of omissions. Philosophy Compass, 10, 3: 208-218. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12206

Clarke, R., Shepherd, J., Stigall, J., Waller, R. R., & Zarpentine, C. (2015). Causation, norms, and omissions: A study of causal judgments. Philosophical Psychology, 28, 2: 279-293. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2013.815099

Henne, P., Pinillos, Á., & De Brigard, F. (2017). Cause by omission and norm: Not watering plants. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 95, 2: 270-283. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402. 2016.1182567

Hitchcock, C. (2007). Prevention, preemption, and the principle of sufficient reason. The Philosophical Review, 116, 4: 495-532. https://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2007-012

Hitchcock, C., & Knobe, J. (2009). Cause and norm. The Journal of Philosophy, 106, 11: 587-612. https://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil20091061128

國際替代計量

不作為因果判斷中的假設性思考問題

全文下載

主題瀏覽