Inside Debt and Corporate Financing Decisions

經理人債型薪酬與公司融資決策

李艷榕(Yen-Jung Lee) ； 沈信漢(Carl Hsin-Han Shen)

《財務金融學刊》 24卷2期 (2016/06) Pp. 1-23

https://doi.org/10.6545/JFS.2016.24(2).1

摘要

我們發現經理人債型薪酬與財務槓桿之間的負向關係是因變數定義方式所導致。為避免此問題，本文檢驗公司融資決策並發現當公司面臨融資需求（擁有剩餘資金）時，有較高債型薪酬的公司會增加（減少）公司債務，且此傾向只在公司財務槓桿偏低時存在。因此債型薪酬確實提供經理人誘因使用低成本債務融資，不會導致過高財務槓桿。

關鍵字

經理人薪酬 ； 債型薪酬 ； 融資決策 ； 財務槓桿

並列摘要

We find that the negative association between firm leverage and inside debt documented by prior research is driven by a mechanical association between these two variables. To circumvent this problem, we focus on the firm’s marginal financing decisions. We show that firms with higher CEO inside debt tend to issue more (retire less) debt when facing financing deficits (surpluses). This tendency is pronounced only when the firm is under-leveraged, but not when it is over-leveraged, suggesting that CEO inside debt allows firms to take advantage of the lower cost of financing, but does not lead to excessive debt.

並列關鍵字

Executive compensation ； inside debt ； financing decision ； leverage

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