Do Bank Regulation and Supervision Stabilize the Banking System? A Cross-Country Systematic Risk Analysis

銀行監理是否能穩定銀行系統？跨國系統風險之研究

劉清標(Chin-Piao Liu) ； 陳安行(An-Sing Chen) ； 林筱鳳(Hsiao-Feng Lin)

《財務金融學刊》 24卷2期 (2016/06) Pp. 55-88

https://doi.org/10.6545/JFS.2016.24(2).3

摘要

本文檢定銀行監理對銀行系統穩定性之影響。研究發現，於正常金融環境中，增強私部門之監督顯著降低尾端與一般貝它值，另外，更高之自有資本顯著降低一般貝它值，卻增加尾端貝它值。政府直接監理、限制銀行業務、或限制新銀行設立，均對尾端或一般貝它值無顯著影響。於金融風暴時，限制新銀行設立可顯著降底尾端貝它值。

關鍵字

銀行監理 ； 系統風險 ； 銀行系統穩定性

並列摘要

This paper conducts a cross-country assessment of the impacts of bank regulation and supervision on the stability of banking sectors. We find that in normal time more private monitoring of banks significantly reduces both the tail beta and the ordinary beta. Greater capital stringency reduces the ordinary beta, but increases the tail beta. Official supervision, bank activity restriction, or banking entry requirements do not have significant impacts on either of them. Finally, during the financial crises, only the restriction on the new entry of banks can significantly reduce the tail beta of the banking sectors.

並列關鍵字

Bank regulation ； systematic risk ； banking system stability

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