CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment: Evidence from the Industry Deregulation

從法規鬆綁探討CEO過度自信與公司投資之關聯性

陳一如(I-Ju Chen)

《財務金融學刊》 28卷2期 (2020/06) Pp. 1-47

https://doi.org/10.6545/JFS.202006_28(2).0001

摘要

This study examines the relationship between CEO overconfidence and corporate investment after deregulation. Industry deregulation allows deregulated firms more operation freedom, gives managers more discretion over operation strategies, and creates a more competitive environment. Therefore, managerial function or decision quality become more and more important after deregulation. Our empirical findings suggest that overconfident CEOs of deregulated firms are more willing to conduct investment, in particular advertising expense, in the post-deregulation period. Furthermore, the deregulated firms with overconfidence CEOs perform better than other matched firms after complete deregulation.

關鍵字

CEO overconfidence ； corporate investment ； industry deregulation

並列摘要

本研究探討政府法規鬆綁後，公司主要經營者是否會因過度自信而影響到公司投資的效益。一般而言，政府法規鬆綁會讓公司在經營上有更大的彈性與競爭，因此公司的管理效能或決策品質變得越來越重要。研究結果顯示，在法規鬆綁的產業中，過度自信的公司經營者常增加廣告的投資，而投資後的績效確實優於未鬆綁的配對公司。

並列關鍵字

CEO過度自信 ； 公司投資 ； 政府法規鬆綁

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