The Signal of Stock Splits: Who Sends the Signal?

股票分割的訊息內涵：誰在釋放訊息？

朱偉光(Wei-Kuang Chu) ； 楊東曉(Tung-Hsiao Yang)

《證券市場發展季刊》 31卷3期 (2019/09) Pp. 1-34

https://doi.org/10.6529/RSFM.201909_31(3).0001

摘要

We test the relationship between stock splits and the signaling hypothesis and emphasize the transmission of long-term future performance in this paper. We analyze the signaling hypothesis in stock splits by linking it to managerial incentives that come from stock-based compensation. Our empirical evidence shows that highly incentivized managers will signal the market about a firm's future performance by splitting stock. In addition, we relate the incentive effect to the short-term and long-term abnormal performance by comparing the market performances of firms that split stocks with those of matching firms without stock splits. We find that splitting firms have better market performance both before and after stock splits than matching firms. Finally, the incentive effect that comes from a manager's stock holding plays an important role in the better performance.

關鍵字

Stock Splits ； Signaling Hypothesis ； Incentive Effect ； Executive Compensation

並列摘要

本文利用股票分割公司為樣本來檢定訊號假說，同時也檢驗股票分割是否與公司的長期表現相關；從經理人薪酬中所隱含的誘因效果來檢定訊號假說：亦即誘因效果是否能解釋公司股票分割的決策。實證結果指出，擁有高誘因效果薪酬結構的經理人較可能利用股票分割來傳遞公司未來表現的相關訊息；此外，利用對照樣本的比較中發現，股票分割的公司在分割前後的表現均優於對照公司，且經理人薪酬結構中的誘因效果在公司未來表現的結果中扮演重要的角色，亦即誘因效果的高低顯著影響股票分割的公司未來表現的好壞。因此，本文提出實證結果支持公司經理人利用股票分割來釋放公司未來表現相關的訊息。

並列關鍵字

股票分割 ； 訊號假說 ； 誘因效果 ； 經理人薪酬

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