本研究主要檢視購買董、監事暨重要職員責任保險(簡稱Directors and Officers Liability Insurance,後續簡稱D&O保險)對異質性風險的影響,並同時考量公司負面資訊宣告-肥貓公司所帶來的效果。本研究發現購買D&O保險會正向顯著影響異質性風險,亦即公司購買D&O保險,部分原屬於公司高階管理人員之訴訟風險轉嫁給保險公司,從而驅使高階管理人員有投機行為。然而,當公司曾經有負面資訊,購買D&O保險反而扮演監督管理當局角色。因此,本研究認為購買D&O保險同時會支持投機主義以及監督假說,唯監督假說觀點主要建立在公司過去是否曾經發生負面資訊或事件。
In this research, we investigate the relationship between D&O insurance and idiosyncratic risk. Moreover, we also consider the moderate effect of the negative event announcement. Using samples from Market Observation Post System (Hereafter, M.O.P.S) and Taiwan Economic Journal database (TEJ). We find that purchase D&O insurance is positively associated with idiosyncratic risk. We also find negative event announcement play a moderate role between purchase D&O insurance and idiosyncratic risk. Our results support the opportunism hypothesis and monitoring hypothesis, but monitoring hypothesis are relying on the firms that have negative event announcement.