本文係首篇基於利害關係人代理人說,將台灣特殊背景納入考量,探討治理結構對企業社會責任(CSR)各構面的影響。治理結構包括經營控制、所有權結構及董事會特質。作者以一套獨特的數據,對243間上市公司進行實證,得到重要發現如下。首先,家族控制公司多以保護家族財富、利益為優先考量,不利於CSR的推動。其次,外國機構投資人持股有利於CSR的實踐。然而,家族控制會對此類有正效果之外部監督機制,形成負向干擾。第三,高學歷或具法教背景的董事均有助於推動CSR。最後,各種治理機制對環保及人權CSR構面之影響效果不同,其差異在綜合式CSR數據裡會被掩蓋。這項有背景特殊性的發現,凸顯理論反思及在地化的重要性。
The majority of previous studies examining Taiwan-based corporations consider corporate social responsibility (CSR) a composite construct. This paper, however, is one of the first that breaks CSR into multiple dimensions. We examine the effects of governance structures, such as managerial control, ownership structure, and board characteristics, on CSR performance based on the stakeholder-agency theory. Using a sample of 243 listed companies and a hand-collected CSR dataset, a few key findings are obtained. Firstly, family members tend to hinder corporate CSR engagement through participation in the board and/or management, so as to safeguard their personal interests and wealth. Secondly, foreign institutional investors might serve as external monitors, contributing to a higher level of CSR involvement. However, such effect might be moderated negatively by family control. Lastly, board members with postgraduate degrees or with professional qualifications in law or education tend to promote CSR. These findings, based on the Taiwan context, demonstrate the importance of theoretical reflection and customization.