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總統和國會的權力平衡與憲政衝突:以總統國會制國家祕魯、俄羅斯、喬治亞和葡萄牙為例

Balance of Power and Constitutional Conflict Between President and Parliament: Comparing Georgia, Peru, Portugal with Russia

摘要


本文的研究問題有二:一、為何特定的總統國會制國家之憲政運作,較容易促成總統和國會的權力對抗(或妥協讓步)?二、府會衝突或和解如何影響半總統制民主的運作?主要的研究發現為總統國會制國家在少數政府或共治政府時期最容易發生行政和立法機關的衝突。當行政和立法機關之間的衝突發生在強總統和強國會對立的模式中,很容易升高成政權危機或是出現憲政崩潰。因為強總統和強國會彼此之間的憲法權力對等或武器相當,特別是在不同黨派分別控制總統和國會時,很容易促成抗衡結果。當行政和立法的互動模式屬於強總統和次強國會的對應時,總統可以略勝國會一籌,推行自己屬意的政策,而當國會可以聚集足夠的多數時,總統還是會受到國會的阻撓,不能恣意行事。當總統擁有較少的憲政武器例如總統並無單邊的委任立法權以及國會擁有低門檻的反否決權時,屬於次強總統對上強國會的設想狀況。此時總統可能相對地較為弱勢,因為國會掌握了立法的最後決定權。當總統只擁有否決權以及國會需要高的門檻才能撤銷總統的否決時,則屬於次強總統和次強國會之間的互動模式。這種模式較可能出現均勢的結果,亦即任何一方無法凌駕對方,雙方必須尋求妥協和讓步。本文以秘魯、俄羅斯、喬治亞和葡萄牙(1976~1982)四個總統國會制國家的運作經驗來說明四種不同的行政和立法的權力平衡與憲政衝突高低之間的關係。

並列摘要


Why some president-parliamentary countries are much easier to facilitate power struggle between the president and parliament and why other president-parliament countries are more likely to encourage compromise or negotiation between the president and parliament are the major research questions of this paper. Four scenarios can be envisioned. First, in the scenario of strong president vs. strong parliament, it is more possible to entice regime crises and democratic breakdown. Second, in the scenario of strong president vs. moderate parliament, the president prevails over the parliament and can promote his preferred policies. However, when the parliament can muster enough votes to pass a bill or override the president's veto, the parliament can have a check on the enactment of presidential powers. Third, in the scenario of moderate president vs. strong parliament, the president does not have unilateral power such as decree power and the parliament has the final authority of legislation. Fourth, in the scenario of moderate president vs. moderate parliament, both branches hang in the balance. This paper illustrates the framework by analyzing the cases of Peru, Russia, Georgia, and Portugal (1976-1982).

參考文獻


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