總經理特質對於家族持股與公司績效關聯性之影響

The Impact of CEO Characteristics on the Relation between Family Ownership and Firm Performance

戴怡蕙(Yi-Hui Tai)

《管理與系統》 26卷3期 (2019/07) Pp. 321-363

https://doi.org/10.29416/JMS.201907_26(3).0003

摘要

過去文獻關於家族持股和公司績效之間的關聯性結論是不一致的，而調節變數可能是影響前述關聯性的原因。又過去文獻提及總經理特質對於公司績效有顯著影響力，因此本研究探討總經理下列四項特質對於家族持股與公司績效之調節效果，分別為：（1）總經理同時兼任董事；（2）總經理由家族成員擔任；（3）總經理經驗；（4）總經理薪酬。本文實證結果發現，若家族持股比率較高，則公司市場績效較差，但會計績效較好。除此之外，總經理由家族成員擔任抑或是提高總經理薪酬會增強（減弱）家族持股與公司績效間的正向（負向）關係。然而，總經理同時兼任董事或總經理經驗較豐富並不會增強（減弱）家族持股與公司績效間的正向（負向）關係。本文研究結果可以補充過去文獻之不足。

關鍵字

家族持股 ； 公司績效 ； 總經理 ； 薪酬 ； 經驗

並列摘要

According to literature, the relation between family ownership and firm performance is inconsistent; therefore, maybe moderating variables are factors influencing the above relation. In addition, prior literature mentions that the characteristics of CEO have significant impacts on firm performance; therefore, this paper aims to investigate the moderating effect of the following four characteristics of CEO on the above relation: (1) the CEO concurrently serves as a director; (2) the CEO serves by the family member; (3) the experience of CEO; (4) the remuneration of CEO. The empirical results show that if the percentage of family ownership is higher, the firm's market performance is poor, but the firm's accounting performance is better. In addition, the result found that letting the CEO serves by the family member or increasing the remuneration of CEO can enhance (mitigate) the positive (negative) relation between family ownership and firm performance; however, letting the CEO concurrently serves as a director or increasing the experience of CEO can not enhance (mitigate) the positive (negative) relation between family ownership and firm performance. The results of this study can supplement the shortcomings of the past literature.

並列關鍵字

Family Ownership ； Firm Performance ； CEO ； Remuneration ； Experience

參考文獻

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